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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation investigates the role of foreign direct investment and agglomeration 
economies in the process of industrial development, with a focus on the productivity of 
manufacturing firms.  The first chapter analyzes the importance of the source of foreign 
direct investment on the performance of domestic Chinese firms.  The second chapter 
studies the interaction between foreign and domestic manufacturing firms operating in the 
same industry and located within the same Chinese city.  The third chapter examines the 
response of multinational companies to changes in domestic institutions.  My findings 
highlight the importance of the source of foreign direct investment, proximity to economic 
activity, and strong institutional incentives in enhancing firm performance in developing 
economies.    
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______________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Foreign Direct Investment, Agglomeration, and 
Productivity 
______________________________________________________ 
My dissertation studies the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
agglomeration economies in the industrial development process in the context of a 
developing economy, China. Recognizing technology as a driver of economic growth, 
governments in developing countries spend significant resources to attract FDI in the hopes 
of realizing positive spillovers in the form of international technology transfer as well as 
opportunities to imitate new products, hire foreign-trained labor, and become suppliers to 
and consumers of intermediate inputs produced by foreign companies, all of which are 
believed to enhance domestic firm performance. However, entry of foreign firms can also 
increase competition in output and input markets spurring domestic firm efficiency or 
forcing them out of the market. In each of my three chapters, outlined in greater detail in 
subsequent paragraphs, I argue that the source of foreign investment as well as the domestic 
economic landscape in which these investments are made shapes the gains that result from 
FDI.  My empirical research leads to three main findings. First, foreign acquirers from more 
developed countries significantly increase domestic firm performance. Second, positive 
spillovers from FDI within a city-industry space tend to decline with increases in 
technological distance between firms. Finally, liberalized ownership rules produce changes in 
the control structures of foreign enterprises as they respond to domestic institutional 
distortions. 
The first chapter examines the importance of the source of foreign direct investment 
on domestic firm performance in a developing country context. Using a newly created panel 
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of domestic Chinese firms who are acquired by foreign investors, I find evidence of higher 
productivity gains by firms acquired by investors from OECD countries relative to those 
acquired by investors from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan (HMT). To control for possible 
endogeneity of the acquisition decision, I employ propensity score matching combined with 
a difference-in-differences approach. The results indicate that relative to HMT-acquired 
firms, OECD-acquired firms experience higher total factor productivity (TFP) in the initial 
year of acquisition and this productivity differential persists in subsequent years, reaching 
24.5% in the third year. Further results point to the introduction of management techniques 
that reduce labor inefficiencies along with capital deepening as likely sources of the TFP 
increase. The TFP differential is stronger in industries with higher domestic content. 
Together, these results suggest that the development level of the investor source country 
affects the opportunities for technology transfer. 
The second chapter examines how the presence of nearby foreign multinational 
companies (MNCs) alters the economic landscape in which domestic enterprises operate. 
MNCs are believed to generate positive own-industry (localization) spillovers. However, 
MNCs also tend to exert negative competitive pressures in output and input markets. Using 
panel data on manufacturing enterprises operating in China during 1998-2006, this paper 
provides empirical evidence on the net effect of these opposing forces that arise in the 
presence of MNCs. Central to the analysis is the opportunity to rank nearby activity, in 
ascending order of productivity, into state, private, and foreign ownership types. Results 
indicate that spillovers are largest within the same ownership types, consistent with the 
presence of traditional localization economies. However, across ownership types spillovers 
differ in two ways. They tend to be much weaker compared to within ownership type 
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spillovers. In addition, spillovers from more productive foreign to less productive domestic 
enterprises are smaller compared to spillovers in the reverse direction. I also find evidence of 
positive spillovers from private-owned enterprises to all three ownership types, suggestive of 
the important role of indigenous private enterprises in the Chinese economy. Finally, I find 
evidence for ethnic networks facilitating localization spillovers. 
The third chapter, coauthored with Mary E. Lovely, utilizes a quasi-experiment in 
China‟s WTO accession to observe multinationals‟ response to changes in property rights in 
a developing country.  WTO accession reduced incentives for joint ventures while reducing 
constraints on wholly owned foreign subsidiaries.  Concomitant with these changes was a 
more liberal investment environment for indigenous investors.  An adaptation of Feenstra 
and Hanson‟s (2005) property rights model suggests that higher productivity and value 
added of a joint venture, but lower domestic sales share, increases the likelihood that the 
venture will become wholly foreign owned following liberalization.  Theory also suggests 
that an enterprise with lower productivity but higher value added and domestic sales will be 
more likely to switch from a joint venture to wholly domestic owned.  Using newly created 
enterprise-level panel data on equity joint ventures and changes in registration type following 
China‟s WTO accession, we find evidence consistent with the property rights theory. More 
productive firms with higher value added and lower domestic sales shares are more likely to 
become wholly foreign owned, while less productive firms focused on the Chinese market 
are more likely to become wholly domestic owned rather than remain joint ventures.  In 
addition to highlighting the importance of incomplete contracts and property rights in the 
international organization of production, these results support the view that external 
 4 
 
commitment to liberalization through WTO accession influences multinational and 
indigenous firms‟ behavior.    
To conclude, the three chapters of my dissertation investigate the roles of foreign 
direct investment and agglomeration economies in enhancing domestic manufacturing firm 
productivity. I find robust evidence that domestic institutions impact the types of foreign 
investment entering a country and that this investment affects local firm productivity and 
organizational form. Greater foreign investment can mean greater access to technology and 
higher domestic firm productivity, providing opportunity for higher incomes and better 
living standards. However, to maximize the benefits from foreign direct investment, my 
thesis underscores the need to understand the source of foreign direct investment and the 
domestic landscape where foreign and domestic firms interact. 
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_______________________________________________________________________ 
2. Origin of FDI and Firm Performance: Evidence from 
Foreign Acquisitions of Chinese Domestic Firms 
______________________________________________________ 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Recognizing technology as a driver of economic growth, governments in developing 
countries spend significant resources to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) in the hope 
of international technology transfer.1,2  Given the geographic concentration of innovation 
activity, however, not all FDI provides the same opportunity for transfer of advanced 
technology to the host country.  In 2000, 82% of global research and development (R&D) 
expenditures were undertaken in Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries and half were performed by the United States and Japan alone (Lovely 
and Popp, forthcoming).  A consequence of this concentration is that multinational firms 
from OECD countries are believed to have superior technological capabilities.3 That this 
superior technology will be transferred to less advanced settings is not guaranteed, however, 
as host-country firms may not have the capacity to absorb superior know-how into their 
production processes.4 Thus, while there is reason to believe that the development level of 
                                                          
1
 “International technology transfer refers to any process by which a party in one country gains access to 
technical information of a foreign party and successfully absorbs it into its production process.” (Glass and 
Saggi, 2008) 
2 See Keller (2004, 2010) for surveys of the literature on international technology diffusion. 
3 Global R&D activity is primarily carried out by multinationals (Pack and Saggi, 1997). 
4 The usage of the term absorptive capacity follows Cohen and Levinthal (1990). 
 6 
 
the investor source country alters the opportunities for technology transfer, the extent of 
such transfer is an open empirical question. 
This paper searches for evidence of technology transfer via FDI, in particular 
through foreign merger and acquisition activity in China, explicitly distinguishing between 
investors from OECD countries and those from the less innovative but nearby economies 
of Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan (HMT).5 The analysis is carried out by comparing the 
post-acquisition productivity performance of OECD and HMT acquired firms.6 An obvious 
challenge in comparisons is the possibility that OECD investors systematically choose high 
productivity Chinese firms as acquisition targets.  Without appropriate recognition of 
possible selection bias, observed post-acquisition performance may reflect superior domestic 
capability rather than superior foreign firm technology transfer.  I account for possible 
endogeneity of the acquisition decision through the use of propensity score matching, by 
which a HMT-acquired firm is assigned to every OECD-acquired firm as a proxy for the 
missing counterfactual of an OECD-acquired firm had it instead been acquired by a HMT 
investor. I then further employ a difference-in-differences approach to control for 
unobservable but time invariant differences between the two groups of acquired firms. 
This paper offers two contributions to the literature that examines the causal link 
between FDI and productivity. First, this study distinguishes between the sources of FDI 
instead of treating all FDI alike and documents differences in post-acquisition productivity 
performance. Existing literature primarily focuses on the foreign ownership effects without 
                                                          
5 The terms mergers and acquisitions are used interchangeably in this paper. See DePamphilis (2010) for a 
detailed overview.  
6 Foreign acquisition is defined as the event when the firm‟s foreign equity share exceeds or equals 25%. See 
section 2.4 for a discussion of the data.  
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distinguishing FDI by source. Although not the focal point of these studies, some exceptions 
include Conyon et al (2002), Harris and Robinson (2003), and Schiffbauer, Siedschlag, and 
Ruane (2009) who find that domestic firms in the U.K. who are acquired by U.S. investors 
experience the largest increase in productivity compared to those acquired by investors from 
the EU or other countries. More recently, a study by Chen (2009) finds that foreign 
acquisitions of U.S. domestic firms lead to increases in sales if the acquirers are from 
industrialized rather than developing countries.  
The second contribution of the present study is its developing country context, 
unlike Chen (2009). Without distinguishing by source countries, previous studies investigate 
post-acquisition productivity performance of domestic firms in developing countries and 
generally find that foreign ownership increases post-acquisition productivity (Arnold and 
Javorcik (2009) focusing on Indonesia; Petkova (2008) on India; and Djankov and Hoekman 
(2000) on the Czech Republic).  However, as noted above, technology transfer may be 
attenuated by the distance between source and host country development level. The present 
study fills this gap by estimating the post-acquisition productivity gain realized by a 
developing country receiving investment from relatively more advanced economies.  
China provides a suitable setting to explore these issues. Since 1993, China has been 
the largest recipient of FDI inflows in the developing world.7 Foreign direct investment in 
China can be broadly classified as originating from the ethnically Chinese economies of 
Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan (HMT) and all other economies but primarily OECD 
countries. Table 2.1 provides the source country share of actually utilized FDI in total non-
HMT FDI between 1998 and 2006. On average, OECD countries accounted for 60% of all 
                                                          
7 See Fung, Iizaka, and Tong (2004) for an overview of the development of China‟s FDI policy and subsequent 
changes in FDI inflows.   
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non-HMT FDI, with the United States and Japan the source of more than half of these 
inflows.8 Hu and Jefferson (2002) find that the high share of FDI coming from advanced 
countries is important for technology transfer in China because OECD investment carries 
“higher technology content.” Furthermore, Zhang (2005) argues that compared to OECD 
investors who operate on frontiers of world technology, HMT investors derive their 
advantages from marketing and on-time delivery skills. 
These source country differences suggest that technology transfer should be more 
pronounced in domestic Chinese firms acquired by OECD firms relative to their HMT-
acquired counterparts.  I investigate this hypothesis by calculating and comparing the post-
acquisition change in total factor productivity (TFP) experienced by OECD-acquired firms 
to that experienced by HMT-acquired firms.  I interpret a positive post-acquisition 
productivity differential as evidence of differences in technology transfer by investor group. 
I build a panel of Chinese domestic manufacturing firms who are acquired by OECD or 
HMT investors between 1999 and 2004, using annual firm-level data collected by China‟s 
National Bureau of Statistics. Difference-in-differences analysis indicates that OECD-
acquired firms experience higher productivity post-acquisition relative to HMT-acquired 
firms, net of the initial difference in the pre-acquisition period. In particular, the TFP 
differential is 12.3% in the year of acquisition, 11.1% one year after and reaches 24.5% in the 
third year. This result is strongest in industries with high domestic content in exports. This 
latter finding suggests that in developing countries with high shares of processing exports, 
such as China, Vietnam, and Mexico, transfer of advanced technology via foreign direct 
investment might not materialize if the local economy specializes in a narrow range of tasks.   
                                                          
8 Henceforth, non-HMT will be referred to as OECD.  
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I further find that relative to HMT-acquired firms, OECD-acquired firms experience 
higher average wage and capital intensity in all post-acquisition periods. Moreover, because 
employment does not increase, average wage increase appears to result from application of 
techniques that improve labor productivity and thereby reduce inefficiencies. There is no 
support for “learning by exporting” effects as I find no post-acquisition increases in the 
share of output that is exported.9  Likewise, there is no evidence of increases in innovation 
measured as the value of new products in total sales. Taken together, these results suggest 
that introduction of management techniques along with capital deepening are the likely 
sources of TFP increases in OECD-acquired firms.  
To explore possible concerns about the propensity score matching technique, I re-do 
the analysis using data on acquired firms in the textile industry only.10 Results from this 
analysis conform to the patterns observed earlier – OECD-acquired firms experience higher 
productivity in post-acquisition periods with the largest impact in the year of acquisition. 
The similar pattern of results lends confidence that the TFP differential is not being driven 
by specifics of the matching technique used.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2.2 provides a conceptual 
framework that predicts differences in the post-acquisition performance of firms facing 
relatively high fixed acquisition costs. I then apply this framework to OECD and HMT 
acquisitions and derive the empirical acquisition model. Section 2.3 discusses the empirical 
strategy. Section 2.4 describes the data and measurement of total factor productivity.  
                                                          
9 “Learning by exporting” is the idea that firms improve their relative productivity after they begin exporting. 
For example, see De Loecker (2007) for a recent empirical study.  
10 For the baseline results, matches for each OECD-acquired firm are not constrained to be within the same 
industry in order to increase the likelihood of successful matches. 
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Section 2.5 presents the empirical findings for all industries and Section 2.6 for the textile 
industry alone. The final section discusses the relevance of these results to our understanding 
of technology transfer.   
 
2.2 Conceptual Framework 
To inform the empirical strategy used in this paper, a simple framework for analyzing 
the acquisition decision of OECD and HMT investors is adapted from Hall (1988). There 
are two types of multinational firms,  ,  (acquirers) – those from OECD countries and those 
from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. The acquirers may differ with respect to firm 
capabilities,       and     . Capability encompasses both productivity as well as perception 
of quality about a firm‟s products and underlying these „revealed‟ capabilities is the know-
how or technology of the firm (Sutton, 2005). There is a domestic target,  , among a pool of 
domestic Chinese firms,  , with a fixed capability,    , located in China. The multinational 
firms bid for the target. The value of acquiring a domestic Chinese target to a representative 
foreign multinational can be expressed as, 
 
          (     )                    (2.2.1) 
 
where   (     ) is the discounted value of the flow of profits from the acquired firm which 
depends on the capabilities of the target as well as the capabilities of the acquirer.     is a 
fixed cost of acquisition and      represents a random shock. I assume that OECD and 
HMT investors differ with respect to fixed costs of acquisition because HMT firms are 
physically and culturally closer to mainland China than are OECD firms. Distance impacts 
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the costs of acquiring information prior to acquisition for due diligence. If an acquirer is 
physically closer, it may be able to discern and act on information more expediently. HMT 
investors also have an advantage in terms of sharing the same language and culture as 
mainland China, and they may have business and family ties that facilitate transactions with 
local firms and authorities. HMT investors also had a first-mover advantage in that they 
entered China well before other investors (Huang, Jin, Qian, 2010) which could have allowed 
them to establish stronger local networks. Formally, I assume that fixed costs of acquisition 
for OECD investors are higher than for their HMT counterparts,             .
11 A 
domestic target will only be acquired if the value of the firm to the foreign acquirer exceeds 
the value of the target as a wholly owned domestic firm,   .
12 The probability that target   is 
acquired by an OECD investor rather than a HMT investor can be expressed as,13 
 
                                      (                                     ).       (2.2.2) 
 
Therefore, the expression for the probability in (2.2.2) becomes, 
    [
               (  (        )    (       ))   (             )     
           (  (        )    (  ))         
].     
(2.2.3) 
                                                          
11 See Huang, Lin, Qian (2010) for a discussion of how cultural proximity enjoyed by HMT investors may 
influence the fixed costs of setting up FDI.  
12     (  )    , where  (  ) represents the discounted value of the flow of profits from the wholly 
domestic owned firm which depends on the capability of the target and    is a random shock. 
13 The acquisition price in Hall (1988) is “an endogenously determined division of the rents which accrue to a 
merger” (p. 17). Guided by my matching strategy, I do not model the mechanism of how the actual acquisition 
price is determined in equilibrium. Equation (2.2.2) simply requires this price to exceed the value of the firm as 
a wholly domestic firm.  
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Assuming that the     ‟s are independently and identically distributed across alternatives 
following a Type I extreme value distribution (McFadden, 1974), we obtain the multinomial 
logit probability that an acquisition will take place as, 
 
     (          )  
    (  (     )     )
∑     (  (     )     )   
 .   (2.2.4) 
 
If we observe a domestic firm that has an equal probability of being acquired by 
either an OECD or a HMT multinational, we can use (2.2.4) to compare the expected profits 
under the two possible outcomes. Because             , it must be the case that the 
OECD investor expects a larger flow of profits from acquisition than does the HMT 
investor. Higher profits are consistent with OECD multinationals having higher fixed 
capabilities,           , and should be observed as higher post-acquisition TFP and 
profits. 
Intuitively, we can think about the implications of (2.2.2) within models with firm 
heterogeneity of acquirers such as Melitz (2003) and Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) 
without making a formal argument. In heterogeneous firm models only higher productivity 
firms are able to cover higher fixed entry costs. Assuming OECD and HMT investors are 
similar in all respects except that OECD investors have a higher fixed cost of acquisition 
relative to HMT investors, then the TFP distribution of OECD buyers who acquire targets 
in China is shifted right compared to that of HMT buyers. Thus, higher fixed acquisition 
costs are consistent with the assumption that the firms from OECD countries investing in 
China have, on average, higher fixed capabilities than those from HMT. We can then expect 
that for a given target post-acquisition productivity will be higher if acquired by an OECD 
 13 
 
firm than by a HMT firm due to the higher capabilities of OECD investors who enter 
China. 
 
2.3 Empirical Strategy 
The goal of this paper is to evaluate the importance of the source of FDI on post-
acquisition performance of domestic firms in a developing country context. To that end, I 
compare the change in total factor productivity of a domestic Chinese firm acquired by an 
OECD investor (treatment group) to that of a domestic Chinese firm acquired by a HMT 
investor (control group). In an ideal setting, I would observe outcomes for an OECD target 
had it been acquired by a HMT investor. However, domestic Chinese firms can be in only 
one of three states of the world – (i) it is acquired by an OECD investor, (ii) it is acquired by 
a HMT investor, or (iii) it remains a domestic firm. In particular,  
  *                 + where   denotes a state of the world or a particular 
treatment in the language of the microeconometric evaluation literature. Thus, we never 
observe the desired counterfactual, leading to a missing data problem.  
Matching is used to construct the missing counterfactual or control group by 
selecting a group of firms from the pool of HMT-acquired firms that share similar 
observable characteristics as the OECD-acquired or treated firms in the pre-acquisition 
period. I employ propensity score matching to construct these counterfactuals, as discussed 
in detail below.14 Matching attenuates potential endogeneity of the acquisition decision, as 
would occur if OECD investors select higher productivity targets.  
                                                          
14 See Blundell and Costa Dias (2002) for a review of alternative methods used for program evaluation. 
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A preview of the unconditional data in Figure 2.1 shows that the distributions of 
TFP of both OECD and HMT targets in the pre-acquisition period are visually almost 
identical. However, the two-sided Smirnov-Kolmogorov test rejects the null hypothesis that 
the distribution of TFP of OECD versus HMT targets come from the same distribution at 
the 1% level.15 This implies that the two distributions differ in a statistical sense and this 
difference could be a result of some sorting based on target TFP. This necessitates the use of 
propensity score matching to compare the performance of OECD-acquired firms with a 
carefully selected group of HMT-acquired firms sharing similar pre-acquisition 
characteristics. Prior to matching, I expect the mean difference between the two groups to 
be statistically significant while no statistical difference should remain after matching in the 
pre-acquisition period. The balancing tests, discussed in detail in Section 2.5.1, show that 
matching minimizes the pre-acquisition differences between OECD and HMT-acquired 
firms.  
 
2.3.1 Propensity Score Matching 
In this study a domestic Chinese firm can be acquired by either an OECD or HMT 
investor. The analysis focuses on the pair wise average treatment effects. Imbens (1999) and 
Lechner (2001) show that the Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) propensity score for the binary 
treatment case extends to the multiple treatment case as well. The focus of this study is only 
on one particular set of pair wise average treatment effect – post-acquisition productivity 
between OECD and HMT acquired firms. Therefore,  and   will represent OECD and 
HMT, respectively. Adopting notation from Lechner (2002a, 2002b), the pair wise average 
                                                          
15 The two-sided Smirnov-Kolmogorov test statistic is 0.0744(0.0000) with p-value in parentheses.  
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treatment effects,   
   
, of treatments  and   for the target firm in treatment  can be 
estimated as, 
 
                          
     (         )   (      )   (      )       (2.3.1.1) 
 
where   
   
 is the expected effect for a target firm randomly drawn from the population of 
participants in treatment . The first expression after the second equality in (2.3.1), 
(            ) which is the outcome for a Chinese domestic target that is acquired by 
an OECD investor, is readily observed for targets that have been acquired by OECD 
investors. However, the counterfactual (           ) which is the outcome for the 
same domestic target had it been acquired by a HMT investor, cannot be observed leading to 
an omitted variable problem.  
It is not possible to design an experiment where assignment of treatment is random, 
in this study an OECD acquisition, which would guarantee that the post-acquisition 
outcomes are independent of the assignment mechanism such that   (      )  
 (      ). In non-experimental studies such as this, the acquisition decision is not 
random and therefore   (      ) cannot be measured using  (      ). Propensity 
score matching is used to construct  (      ) by selecting a match for every OECD-
acquired firm from the group of HMT-acquired firms, based on a set of similar observable 
characteristics,  . Matching eliminates differences between OECD and HMT acquired firms 
based on the observable characteristics included in  . However, the vector of covariates,  , 
may be very large leading to the “curse of dimensionality” that arises when trying to match 
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on multiple observable characteristics (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) and can be overcome 
using the propensity score that is a scalar variable.   
In order to estimate the marginal probabilities, the value of acquisition to a 
representative foreign multinational is modeled as a function of the target‟s pre-acquisition 
characteristics, including productivity, sales, age, capital-labor ratio, average wage, and state 
equity share. The estimation also includes year, region, and industry fixed effects. The 
estimation results are discussed in detail under Section 2.5.  
 
2.3.2 Propensity Score Matching Difference-in-Differences 
In addition to observable differences, there might be other systematic, unobservable 
differences between the two groups of acquired firms that are time invariant. The difference-
in-differences matching (DDM) estimator addresses this issue by eliminating unobservable, 
time-invariant differences between the two acquired groups of firms. The estimator,     
   
, 
compares the change in the average TFP between a time period preceding the acquisition 
and a time period after the acquisition. Specifically, 
 
    
     .(    
      
 )  (    
      
 )|     /   
            (    
      
       )   (    
      
 |     )           (2.3.2.1) 
 
where   denotes the year of acquisition and   denotes the number of years after the 
acquisition and     is the year preceding the acquisition.  
Formally, two conditions must be satisfied to achieve identification. The first is the 
conditional independence assumption (CIA) which requires that treatment participation is 
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orthogonal to treatment outcome conditional on observable characteristics,  . This 
condition is sometimes called a “data hungry” identification strategy because it requires the 
researcher to observe all characteristics that jointly influence the potential outcomes as well 
as the selection into the treatments. The dataset used in this paper contains detailed balance 
sheet, income sheet and other demographic information about the targets in the pre and 
post-acquisition periods which acquirers use to make their acquisition decisions. The detailed 
nature of the dataset makes it easier to justify that CIA is not being violated (Lechner, 
2002a). When propensity score matching is combined with difference-in-differences, CIA is 
extended to condition on both observables and time-invariant unobservables and is known 
as the bias stability assumption (Heckman, Ichimura, Todd, 1997). In the context of this 
study, the bias stability assumption implies that time varying unobservables play no role in 
which Chinese domestic target gets acquired by either an OECD or HMT investor.  
The second condition is the common support or overlap condition. This requires 
that all economic agents with the same values of   have a positive probability of being in 
both the treated or control groups. The overlap condition substitutes for the absence of 
experimental control units. In a randomized experiment where the treatment and control 
samples are randomly drawn from the same population, the treatment effect for the treated 
and untreated groups are identical. In the context of this study, the common support 
requirement ensures that although matches for OECD-acquired firms, from the pool of 
HMT-acquired firms, might not necessarily be drawn from the same population, we will 
observe the same set of pre-treatment characteristics for these two groups so that 
comparisons are only made with similar firms.   
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Adopting Lechner‟s (2001) notation the propensity score matching difference-in-
differences estimator can be written as,  
 
    
     (    
      
     )       ( )[ (    
      
 |     ( )    )    ] 
           (2.3.2.2) 
 where      ( )  
  ( )
  ( )   ( )
 is the propensity score in the multiple treatment framework 
and    . Replacing  and   with OECD and HMT,     ( ) and      ( ) are the 
individual marginal probabilities of being acquired by a HMT and OECD investor 
respectively, conditional on  .16 These individual marginal probabilities 
[ ̂   ( )  ̂    ( )] can be estimated in the multiple treatment case using multinomial 
logit or probit functions to estimate the conditional probability,             ( )  
    ( )
    ( )      ( )
. Alternatively, Lechner (2002a) shows that the average treatment effect on 
the treated   
   
, is also identified by conditioning jointly on the individual marginal 
probabilities instead of conditioning on the conditional probability alone. Lechner (2002a, 
2002b) also argues that it may be attractive to condition jointly on the marginal probabilities 
instead of on the conditional probability since      ( ) is the expectation of  
  ( )
  ( )   ( )
 
conditional on the marginal probabilities.   
I follow the matching protocol described in Lechner (2002) to construct the missing 
counterfactual,  (    
         
          ). First,  ̂   ( ) and  ̂    ( ) are estimated 
from a multinomial logit model. Second, the common support condition is implemented 
                                                          
16     ( )   (         )       ( )   (          ). 
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using the minima and maxima comparison. Under this criterion, all observations whose 
propensity score is smaller than the minimum and larger than the maximum in the opposite 
group are deleted. Only one firm was deleted from the sample of OECD-acquired firms 
after implementing the common support condition. The common support condition ensures 
that any combination of characteristics observed in the group of OECD-acquired firms can 
also be observed among the group of HMT-acquired firms. Finally, a HMT-acquired firm 
that is closest in terms of the multivariate score,  [ ̂   ( )  ̂    ( )], to an OECD-
acquired firm is chosen as the missing counterfactual.17 Closeness is measured using the 
Mahalanobis distance metric.18 Once each OECD-acquired firm has been assigned a 
counterfactual firm, difference-in-differences is performed as shown in (2.3.2.2). I expect  
    
         , when the outcome is productivity, since capabilities of OECD acquirers are 
posited to be higher relative to those of HMT acquirers. 
 
2.4 Data 
The sample used in this study has been constructed from the Annual Surveys of 
Industrial Production (ASIP) conducted by China‟s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 
during 1998-2006. The Annual Surveys of Industrial Production includes all non-state 
owned firms whose annual sales exceed 5 million yuan19 (referred to as “above-scale” by 
                                                          
17 A HMT-acquired firm may be chosen multiple times for different OECD-acquired firms. This could lead to 
an inflation of variance if few observations are used repeatedly. This is not a problem in this study due to a 
sufficiently large pool of HMT-acquired firms.  
18 √. ̂    ( )   ̂   ( )/
 
    
  . ̂    ( )   ̂   ( )/, where     is the sample covariance matrix of the 
HMT-acquired group. See Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) for further details. 
19 This amounts to approximately $US 600,000 over this period.  
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NBS) and all state-owned enterprises.20 The dataset contains detailed information on the 
firm and its operations, including geographic administrative code, ownership type, gross 
industrial output value, value added, export value, total employment, capital stock, and 
intermediate inputs. The dataset also provides information about the equity shares in a firm 
distinguishing between domestic and foreign sources. The foreign sources of equity are 
further subdivided into those from OECD and HMT investors. Unfortunately, information 
about individual source countries within these two broad categories is not available, so I 
restrict the analysis to a comparison between these two groups.  
The sample of firms used in the matching analysis is constructed as follows. From 
the overall sample, I identify domestic firms that are observed one year prior to acquisition 
and henceforth are acquired by either a HMT or OECD investor and remain under that 
particular foreign ownership for two years after acquisition. Thus, the sample consists of 
firms that are acquired between 1999 and 2004.21 Foreign acquisition is defined as an event 
where the foreign equity share equals or exceeds 25%.22 The final matching sample used in 
the analysis consists of 1,493 firms acquired by OECD investors and each of these firms is 
paired with a firm from a group of 1,813 firms acquired by HMT investors.23 Table A2 
                                                          
20The NBS classifies non state-owned enterprises to include collectively-owned enterprises, Chinese indigenous 
privately-owned enterprises, and foreign-owned enterprises operating in China. The industry section of China 
Statistical Yearbook is compiled based on this dataset. Basic information of each four-digit industry in the 
China Markets Yearbook is also based on this dataset. 
21 To alleviate concerns that only survivors and by implication higher productivity firms are disproportionately 
included in the sample, I calculate the exit rates for acquired firms, differentiated by the origin of the investor, 
who drop out of the sample in years t+1 and t+2 respectively. The exit rates do not differ substantially by 
investor type lending confidence that the sample of OECD and HMT-acquired firms are comparable. 
22 This threshold is set by the Chinese government. 
23 The original sample consisted of 1,798 firms acquired by OECD investors and 2,151 firms acquired by HMT 
investors. Of those acquired by OECD (HMT) investors, 304 (338) change two-digit industry categories in the 
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provides a breakdown of the number of acquired firms by two-digit industry under the 
Chinese Industrial Classification (CIC).  
I estimate the marginal probabilities using what Lechner (2002a) calls the structural 
approach where “the idea is to formulate the complete choice problem in one model and 
estimate it on the full sample.” (p. 209). Therefore, for constructing the propensity scores, I 
utilize the full sample to model the separate marginal probabilities of being acquired by 
either an OECD or HMT investor using a multinomial logit model. The advantage of the 
structural approach is the ease of understating the empirical factors behind the joint selection 
process as opposed to computing binary conditional choices, one at a time.24 
 
2.4.1 Productivity 
The key outcome variable of interest in this study is firm-level total factor 
productivity (TFP). TFP is an indirect measure of technology transfer in that it is an 
outcome due to gains in efficiency following technological diffusion after an acquisition 
(Keller 2004, 2010). Unavailability of data prohibits the use of more direct measures such as 
expenditure on patent licensing fees or payments for blueprints of technology.  
Using TFP levels as a measure of technology transfer, however, could pose a 
particular challenge. Keller (2004, 2010) cautions that TFP may suffer from measurement 
error, due to usage of the values of outputs and inputs rather than the physical quantities. 
Thus, gains due to technological transfers may be confounded by higher mark-ups. This 
                                                                                                                                                                             
post-acquisition period and are consequently dropped to ensure comparison within the same industry. 1 
OECD-acquired firm was not on the common support and also excluded from the analysis.  
24 Lechner (2002a) calls computing binary conditional choices one at a time the reduced form approach. He 
finds that in application, the matching estimators using the reduced form versus the structural approach yield 
similar results.  
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paper considers changes in TFP as opposed to TFP levels in order to mitigate concerns 
about measurement error. Keller (2004, 2010) argues that considering changes in TFP as 
opposed to level “will help in identifying technology if spurious factors do not change over 
time, or more generally, if they change less than technology.”  
Total factor productivity is measured as the residual of a Cobb-Douglas production 
function estimation. Specifically, TFP of a firm   in period   is,  
 
          (                                           ).            (2.4.1.1) 
 
The input coefficients,    and   , are first determined by estimating, 
 
                                                                   (2.4.1.2) 
 
where     represents the part of productivity shock that is observed by the firm but 
unobserved by the econometrician and     represents an error term uncorrelated with the 
other inputs. Since the firm observes    , the unobserved component of productivity could 
affect input choices so that OLS yields inconsistent estimates of the production factors 
(Marschak and Andrews, 1944).  
To address this potential simultaneity bias, I employ the semi-parametric method 
proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).25 I estimate the production function for each CIC 
four digit industry to allow the returns to inputs to vary across industries. This procedure 
uses intermediate inputs to proxy for the unobservable productivity shock,    . 
                                                          
25 Carried out using the Stata module levpet (Petrin, Poi, Levinsohn, 2004). 
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Computation of TFP using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method requires information 
on firm value added, labor, capital and intermediate inputs. The dataset provides information 
on nominal values of firm value added, capital, and intermediate inputs. These are converted 
to real terms using the output, investment, and input deflators, respectively, in Brandt et al. 
(2009).26 In addition, an alternative measure of productivity, labor productivity, is used to 
establish robustness of the results to different measures of productivity. 
 
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Multiple Treatment Matching Results 
Two marginal probabilities must be estimated to construct the counterfactuals for 
the pool of firms acquired by OECD investors. The first is the probability that a domestic 
Chinese firm is acquired by an OECD investor,  ̂    ( ), and the second is the probability 
that a domestic Chinese firm is acquired by a HMT investor,  ̂   ( ), both conditional on 
observable characteristics,  . I obtain these probabilities through estimation of the 
multinomial logit model in (2.2.4). Explanatory variables that affect both the treatment 
(acquired by an OECD investor) as well as the outcome (total factor productivity) are 
included in this equation.27 The choice of variables is also guided by existing literature 
including Huang, Ma, Yang, Zhang (2008), Arnold and Javorcik (2004), Petkova (2008), and 
Chen (2009).  All explanatory variables are measured as of the pre-acquisition period. 
Evidence suggests that foreign investors rely on observable characteristics of a target 
firm to make acquisition decisions (Arnold and Javorcik, 2004; Chen, 2009) making it more 
                                                          
26 The deflators are available at http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/public/N07057/CHINA/appendix/. 
27 See Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for a discussion of implementing propensity score matching techniques. 
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likely that CIA holds. However, there might be concerns that selection of targets by 
acquirers could be guided by unobservable preferential policy treatments that vary over time. 
Selection on unobservables will pose challenges for identification in this study if OECD 
investors received preferential treatment over HMT investors. However, evidence suggests 
otherwise. Huang, Jin, Qian (2010) document that Chinese domestic policy has been 
uniformly non-discriminatory for all FDI since the early 1990s.  
Variables included in the multinomial logit model are pre-acquisition TFP, sales and 
sales squared, age and age squared, capital to labor ratio, wage per worker, share of exports 
in total sales, share of equity held by the state in total capital28 Inclusion of TFP is intended 
to control for any selection on productivity such as “cherry-picking”, a phenomenon where 
some foreign firms acquire better performing domestic firms. Because TFP is a generated 
regressor, standard errors are bootstrapped. Total sales proxy for firm size. Age captures the 
stage of development of the firm as well as variations in production and management 
experiences. It also acts as a control for survival of more productive companies. Capital per 
worker is a measure of the potential productive capacity of the firm embodied in its capital 
stock. Average enterprise wage captures the average skill level of the domestic firm‟s labor. 
Share of exports in total sales is indicative of the level of integration of the firm in world 
markets.  
In addition, the model includes a set of year, two-digit industry, and region fixed 
effects.29 Year dummies control for macroeconomic shocks, such as inflation and other 
                                                          
28 All nominal values are converted to real values. 
29 Regions are comprised of the following groups of provinces – (i) Coastal: Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, 
Hainan, Jiangsu, Shandong, Tianjin, Zhejiang, Hebei; (ii) Inland: Shanxi, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan; 
(iii) Northeast: Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang; (iv) Southwest: Guangxi, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Chongqing; 
(v) Northwest: Inner Mongolia, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang. 
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national shocks. Industry dummies control for industry specific technology, skill 
requirements, and other industry specific common shocks. Region dummies control for 
location specific natural resources, infrastructure, and policies. Region dummies further 
control for the scale of activity or agglomeration of firms. For instance, OECD (HMT) 
investors who acquire targets in a region where there are other OECD (HMT) firms may 
face lower fixed costs of acquisition due to pre-established networks that reduce the cost of 
acquiring information.  
Table 2.2 reports the coefficients from the multinomial logit model. Results indicate 
that smaller (proxied by sales), older, more export-oriented and firms with lower capital-
labor ratios and higher state equity shares are more likely to be acquired by either OECD or 
HMT investors. The coefficients on TFP, although not significant at conventional levels, 
along with the coefficients on wage per worker suggest that more productive firms are more 
attractive to OECD compared to HMT investors. After obtaining  ̂    ( )  and  ̂   ( ) 
for every target firm, I apply one-to-one Mahalanobis matching to assign a counterfactual 
firm for every OECD target.  
To assess how well the propensity score matching performs, tests of the balancing 
hypothesis are carried out and presented in Appendix 2A. The first test calculates the 
standardized bias for each of the covariates included in the multinomial logit model. This 
measures the distance in marginal distributions of the covariates and is defined as the 
difference in the sample means of the OECD-acquired and HMT-acquired firms weighted 
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by the square root of the average sample variances in both groups.30 A bias reduction of 3 to 
5% once matching has been performed is considered to be sufficient (Caliendo and 
Kopeinig, 2008). The second test compares the sample means between OECD-acquired and 
HMT-acquired firms before and after matching. The expectation is that prior to matching 
we should find that the difference between the means are statistically significant which 
becomes statistically insignificant after matching. Both sets of tests pass the required 
standards. Also, on average, the absolute distance in terms of the multivariate score between 
the matched pairs is 0.02, a measure that is bound between 0 and 1. These results from tests 
of the balancing hypothesis show that matching is capable of creating a control group that is 
very similar to the treatment group in the pre-acquisition period.  
 
2.5.2 Baseline Results from Matching Difference-in-Differences 
Table 2.3 provides the baseline results. The upper panel reports results on TFP and 
the lower panel considers labor productivity measured as the logarithm of value added per 
worker. The estimator reported is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) from 
(2.3.2.2), which is the average difference in TFP between the matched pair of firms, net of 
the initial difference in the pre-acquisition period. In the year of acquisition, the ATT is 
equal to 0.123. This means that having accounted for the initial difference between the two 
groups, OECD-acquired firms exhibit 12.3% higher TFP compared to HMT-acquired firms. 
The TFP differential is 11.1% in the year after acquisition. By the third year, it increases to 
24.5%.  These effects are all statistically significant. Focusing on labor productivity, I observe 
                                                          
30              
 ̅   ̅ 
√    (  ( )   ( ))
;             
 ̅    ̅  
√    (   ( )    ( ))
; where   and   are the treated and 
control groups and   and   are the same for the matched sample.  
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similar patterns. In the year of acquisition, OECD-acquired firms exhibit 17.7% higher 
productivity relative to HMT-acquired firms. This difference persists in the year after at 
15.3% and reaches 22.4% in the third year. These effects are also statistically significant. 
The productivity gains are highest in the year of acquisition and relatively modest 
thereafter. This pattern is similar to that found for domestic firms who are acquired by 
foreign firms in Indonesia (Arnold and Javorcik, 2009).31 I also find that the positive TFP 
differential is not a result of decreases in TFP at HMT-acquired firms in the post-acquisition 
period.32 Both acquired groups of firms experience higher TFP in the post-acquisition 
period. However, the increase is larger for OECD-acquired firms in the post-acquisition 
period. These results suggest that OECD ownership confers a productivity advantage 
relative to HMT ownership.   
 
2.5.3 Endogeneity 
This paper identifies the differential causal impact of OECD versus HMT ownership 
on Chinese target firm performance using a propensity score matching difference in 
differences approach. The identification assumption underlying this approach is that there is 
no role for time varying unobservable factors in the foreign acquisition decision. In the 
context of this study, one type of unobservable time varying factor that might be cause for 
potential concern is the possibility that relative to HMT investors, OECD investors are 
                                                          
31 Using propensity score matching difference-in-differences technique, the authors find that ATT using TFP is 
0.106, 0.122, and 0.135 in the year of acquisition, one and two years after respectively. Arnold and Javorcik 
(2009) do not distinguish between the different sources of FDI. The comparison is between firms who were 
acquired by foreign firms and those that remained domestic owned.  
32 For example, the average TFP of OECD (HMT) acquired firms is 6.06 (6.096) in the pre-acquisition period 
and increases to 6.281 (6.194) in the year of acquisition. 
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better at identifying and acting on information not directly available from financial 
statements and other observable target characteristics. For example, OECD investors could 
be better at identifying talented managers who would contribute to the future growth of the 
firm. These types of information differ from “hard” verifiable information and are referred 
to as “soft” information in the finance and accounting literatures (Stein, 2002).  
To address concerns of particular time varying unobservable characteristics driving 
the results such as OECD investors‟ superior ability to gather “soft” information compared 
to HMT investors, I carry out two checks. First, I focus on acquisitions that take place in 
HMT-dense provinces. Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of the number of foreign projects 
by type of investor across China‟s twenty eight provinces.  
I consider provinces to be HMT-dense where the share of HMT projects in total 
number of foreign projects exceeds 70%.33 Since HMT investors share cultural, business and 
family ties to mainland China, we would expect these investors to have an advantage over 
OECD investors in gathering “soft” information in HMT-dense provinces. Therefore, if we 
observe an OECD ownership premium even in these provinces it would allay fears that the 
results are not predominantly being driven by such time varying unobservable factors. Panel 
(a) in Table 2.4 presents the results for log profits and panel (b) for log total factor 
productivity. Looking at both panels, it indeed appears that HMT investors may have an 
advantage over OECD investors in the year of acquisition as suggested by the negative 
                                                          
33 These include provinces of Henan, Hunan, Jiangxi, Fujian, Guangdong, Inner Mongolia, and Guangxi. The 
results are qualitatively similar if I focus only on those provinces where the HMT share in investment exceeds 
80%, namely provinces of Jiangxi and Fujian. 
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results. However, by the second and third year after acquisition, OECD-acquired targets 
exhibit both higher profits and higher productivity compared to HMT-acquired targets.34  
 Second, I divide the acquired sample by those that are state-owned versus those that 
are domestic private-owned in the pre-acquisition period. Peng (2006) cautions foreign 
investors to consider particular characteristics of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
prior to acquisition. One is that SOEs are characterized by organizational slack. However, 
their books could show high depreciation and reserve funds as well as retained earnings that 
would provide an inaccurate picture of the firm. The other cautionary characteristic is that 
SOEs are known to maintain three sets of books – one for administrative superiors 
exaggerating performance, one for tax purposes underreporting performance, and finally one 
for the managers themselves accurately reflecting performance. Foreign investors are likely 
to be shown the books exaggerating performance. In light of these SOE characteristics, we 
would expect foreign investors to conduct more careful due diligence both in terms of 
“hard” and “soft‟ information when considering state compared to domestic private targets. 
Therefore, if “soft” information was a major driver of the results, we would expect the 
performance of OECD acquired targets that were state-owned in the pre-acquisition period 
to differ markedly, in particular be higher, compared to private-owned targets.  
Table 2.5 displays the results for log of total factor productivity divided by the two 
target ownership types in the pre-acquisition period. We see that in all years after acquisition, 
both types of OECD-acquired targets are more productive than their HMT-acquired 
counterparts. The performance of OECD relative to HMT acquired firms do not differ by 
                                                          
34 The results are not significant at conventional levels, except for profit differential in the third year of 
acquisition, which is most likely due to the reduction in sample size.  
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the target ownership type.35 Together, the results in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 provide robust 
evidence of persistent OECD relative to HMT ownership premium. 
 
2.5.4 What Explains the OECD Productivity Premium? 
To understand the restructuring process that takes place after a foreign acquisition, 
as well as the factors that might explain the differential increase in TFP in OECD-acquired 
firms relative to HMT-acquired firms, I consider several other outcomes. These results are 
presented in Table 2.6. Since it is hypothesized that OECD multinationals have a higher 
fixed cost of acquisition, it should be the case that post-acquisition the OECD-acquired 
firms exhibit higher profits to justify their willingness to incur the higher fixed cost of 
acquisition. Changes in log of total profits between the two acquired groups of firms support 
this framework. Panel (a) in Table 5 shows that relative to HMT-acquired firms, OECD-
acquired firms experience higher total profits in all years during and after acquisition. The 
difference is in the order of 26.6%, 35.3%, and 52.3% for the year of, one and two years 
after acquisition, respectively.36  
Similar analyses are conducted for five additional outcomes: changes in average 
wage, employment, capital intensity (capital-labor ratio), export intensity (export to sales 
ratio), and innovation intensity (the share of new product output value in total sales) 
between the acquired firms. Panel (b) shows that OECD-acquired firms pay higher average 
                                                          
35 Pair-wise t-tests of differences in mean differential productivity between the two ownership types reject the 
null at the 1% significance level.  
36 There might be concern that relative to OECD firms, HMT firms engage more in transfer pricing which 
leads to lower reported profits. However, Huang, Jin, and Qian (2010) do not find evidence to support that 
lower profits in HMT firms are a result of transfer pricing activities. Moreover, Chan and Chow (1997) do not 
find evidence to support transfer pricing activities by foreign owned firms, either HMT or non-HMT, 
operating in China.  
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wages in each year post-acquisition. Higher average wages could mean that OECD-acquired 
firms employ higher skilled workers on average. However, panel (c) shows that OECD-
acquired firms do not experience changes in employment relative to HMT-acquired firms. 
The Annual Surveys of Industrial Production do not provide information by skill level of 
workers in all years. Therefore, I cannot directly observe changes in the skill intensity of the 
labor force post-acquisition, which would have provided evidence that the productivity 
differential between OECD and HMT-acquired firms is driven partly by changes in skill 
composition. If higher average wages are not a result of employing more skilled worker, it is 
also consistent with workers becoming more productive once they are under new 
management. Such an interpretation suggests that OECD-acquired firms bring superior 
management know-how that reduces waste and increases labor productivity.  
Referring to panel (d), we see that relative to HMT-acquired firms, OECD-acquired 
firms increase the amount of capital per worker in the year of acquisition while the increase 
is more modest in the following two years. Capital intensity increases differentially by 21.5%, 
25.9%, and 21.4% respectively in these years and these results are statistically significant.  
The largest increase is in the year of acquisition which is also the same time period when I 
observe the largest increase in TFP. This suggests that OECD investors immediately 
improve capital in the acquired firms.    
Next, I consider if OECD-acquired firms export a larger share of their output. 
Productivity differential could be driven by “learning by exporting” effects where knowledge 
transfer occurs via exporting activity. However, results show that OECD-acquired firms do 
not raise the share of exports in total sales any more or less than HMT-acquired firms. Recall 
that domestic Chinese firms with high exports to sales ratios were more likely to be acquired 
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by both types of investors (see Table 2.2). It is possible that the acquired firms were already 
well integrated into world markets and therefore there are limited opportunities for 
knowledge transfer via the exporting channel.  
Finally, under panel (f), I look for changes in innovative activity in the acquired 
firms, measured as the output value of new products produced in a given year as a share of 
total sales. The idea is that if OECD firms operate on the frontiers of world technology 
relative to HMT firms, they are more likely to introduce product innovation within the 
acquired firm. Results show that there is no difference in changes to innovation intensity of 
OECD relative to HMT-acquired firms.37  
The evidence presented so far reveal that the likely source of the TFP differential 
between OECD and HMT acquired firms is technology transfer embodied in the capital 
brought in by OECD investors. Evidence also suggests that OCED investors might also be 
introducing management techniques that boost worker productivity and thereby reduce 
inefficiencies.  
 
2.5.5 Technology Transfer and Domestic Content 
To explore the technology transfer channel further, I distinguish between industries 
with high and low domestic content in production. Domestic content embodies the 
domestic value added in the production process. In particular, I consider the role of 
domestic content in exports due to the pervasive nature of export processing in Chinese 
                                                          
37 The new product output value is zero for most firms and becomes positive over the sample period for a 
given firm leading to different sample sizes each year. Expenditures on R&D would have been a better measure 
of innovative activity since new products might take time to introduce while R&D activity could begin 
relatively soon. However, data on R&D expenditures are only available for the years 2005 and 2006 so that 
changes in this outcome cannot be measured for my sample. Post-acquisition differential changes in intangible 
assets in the share of total assets were also found to be insignificant.  
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trade and the important role of foreign firms. In 2002, the share of processing exports in 
total Chinese exports was 60% while processing exports accounted for 71% of exports by 
Sino-foreign joint venture firms (Koopman, Wei, Zhang, 2008).38 The scope for 
improvement in TFP via technology transfer is expected to be greater in industries where the 
domestic content in production is higher. In industries with low domestic content, the 
production process could simply involve assembling imported parts into a final good or 
processing according to foreign specifications leaving no room for innovation.39 For 
example, Chinese workers account for only about 3% of the value added for one iPod 
assembled in China and exported to the U.S.40 Therefore, there may be little scope for 
technology transfer in industries characterized by low domestic content.  
Dean, Fung, and Zhang (forthcoming) measure domestic content by input-output 
sectors.41 Using the concordance provided in Brandt, Biesebroeck, Zhang (2009), the input-
output sectors are matched to four-digit industries under the Chinese Industrial 
Classification. Then using the domestic content for each four-digit industry within a two-
digit industry, an average is computed at the two-digit industry level.42 Appendix 2B provides 
a ranking of the two-digit industries by domestic content. We see that the industries with 
                                                          
38 In 2002, processing exports accounted for 87.9% of total exports by wholly owned foreign firms. 
39 See Feenstra and Hanson (2005) for details on China‟s export processing regime. 
40 Koopman, Wang, Wei (2008) provide citations that estimate the value added attributable to Chinese workers 
to be about $4 for a unit of 30GB video model of the iPod whose total export value in 2006 was $150.  
41 Dean, Fung, Wang (2007) provide estimates of vertical specialization (VS) by sector which represents the 
foreign content in exports. Domestic content is calculated as (1 - VS).  
42 For example, the VS measures for four-digit industries 2412 (“Pen manufacturing”) and 2440 (“Toy 
manufacturing”) are 0.028 and 0.132 respectively. Therefore, the average for two-digit industry 24 
(“Manufacture of articles for culture education, and sport activity”) is 0.08 and the domestic content is 
calculated as (1 – 0.08) = 0.92. The VS numbers used are from the last column in Table 3 in Dean, Fung, 
Zhang (2007)  
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high domestic content are what might traditionally be considered less technologically 
sophisticated.43 Industries that are thought to have higher technology content or to be R&D 
intensive actually have very low domestic content in their exports.  
Table 2.7 extends the baseline results by differentiating industries with high and low 
domestic content in exports. We find that, post-acquisition, the productivity differential 
between OECD and HMT-acquired firms is most pronounced in high domestic content 
industries. This is consistent with the idea that the productivity advantage is due to transfer 
of technology from OECD partners in terms of technological, management, or marketing 
know-how. These results are also consistent with the finding in Hu, Jefferson, and Jinchang 
(2005) that foreign technology transfer in China (measured as a firm‟s expenditure on 
technology purchased from a foreign provider such as payments for blueprints of 
technology) is more intensive in less technologically advanced industries.44  
 
2.6 Matching within Industry 
Although controls for two-digit industry fixed effects are included in the multinomial 
logit model used to construct the propensity scores, the HMT-acquired firms that form the 
comparison group are not necessarily chosen from within the same industry as the OECD-
acquired firms. In general, the sample size does not allow it. Therefore, a potential concern is 
that industry sorting could be driving the differences in post-acquisition TFP. Appendix 2C 
provides the number of acquisitions within each two-digit industry. We see that the number 
                                                          
43 Dean, Fung, Zhang (2007) define an industry to be highly vertically specialized if the foreign content of 
exports exceeds 25%. Following their definition, an industry is categorized as having high domestic content if 
the domestic content of exports exceeds 75%.  
44 Hu, Jefferson, Jinchang (2005) categorize the following industries as less technologically advanced – tobacco, 
textile, apparel, leather, furniture, paper, printing, and rubber.   
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of acquisitions by the two types of investors is similar within each industry providing a 
relatively limited pool to choose from. The average treatment effect on the treated is 
identified only in the region of common support. To ensure that there is sufficient overlap 
between the two groups a larger number of HMT-acquired firms would increase the 
likelihood of better matches for each OECD-acquired firm propelling the choice to match 
across industries having controlled for industry effects in the propensity score estimation.   
Previous studies of the impact of foreign ownership on domestic firm productivity 
using matching difference-in-differences technique face similar constraints. For example, 
Petkova (2008) and Chen (2009) who study Indian and U.S. firms, respectively, carry out 
their difference-in-differences analyses after matching across industries. A notable exception 
is Arnold and Javorcik (2009), who study post-acquisition TFP gains to Indonesian firms 
and conduct their analysis after matching within the same four-digit industry as well as year 
when the foreign acquisition occurred. Their counterfactual is constructed from the universe 
of all domestic Indonesian firms employing more than twenty workers, providing a 
sufficiently large pool for selecting good matches.   
To attenuate concerns about matching across industries, I repeat the matching 
difference-in-differences analysis for the group of acquired firms within the textile industry 
only. I group the textile industry to be composed of two-digit industries 17 (Manufacture of 
Textile) and 18 (Manufacture of Textile Wearing Apparel, Footwear, and Caps). The textile 
industry provides the largest number of HMT-acquired firms relative to OECD-acquired 
firms to choose and, thus, provide a sufficient pool for matching. There are a total of 416 
possible HMT-acquired firms that can potentially be matched to the 258 OECD-acquired 
firms.   
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The multinomial logit model and the results from the balancing tests are provided in 
Appendix 2D and 2E respectively. The coefficients in Appendix 2D, for multinomial logit 
model, are similar to those in Table 2 for all industries. The balancing tests in Appendix 2E 
show that overall, matching reduces the standardized bias by at least 3-5% while the t-tests 
yield statistically insignificant differences between the mean of the variables once matching is 
performed.45  
The matching difference-in-differences results for textiles only are presented in Table 
2.8. We find that OECD-acquired firms exhibit higher TFP in all years after acquisition 
although the result is only statistically significant in the year of acquisition. The results are 
imprecisely measured in the following two years and are likely a result of the reduced sample 
size. However, the pattern of results is similar to those reported in Table 2.3 where the 
largest increase in TFP occurs in the year of acquisition. Carrying out the analysis within the 
same industry and finding evidence of higher TFP in OECD-acquired firms lends 
confidence that the main results are not being driven by industry differences. 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
Developing countries compete to attract foreign direct investment in hopes of 
bridging the technology gap with advanced nations and spurring economic growth. 
Multinational firms are viewed as conduits of sophisticated know-how, management 
techniques and marketing skills. However, an overwhelming share of global R&D activity 
undertaken in OECD countries suggests that the source of foreign investment is an 
                                                          
45 The standardized bias actually increases and the t-tests are significant for sales and capital per worker after 
matching. However, the average absolute distance between the matched pairs in terms of 
[ ̂   ( )  ̂    ( )] is only 0.12, a measure that is bound between 0 and 1.       
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important determinant of how much technology transfer actually occurs. Although we may 
expect the possibility of technology transfer to increase with the superiority in technological 
capabilities of multinational firms, host-country firms in a developing country like China may 
not have the capacity to absorb superior know-how into their production processes. This 
study compares the performance of domestic Chinese firms acquired by OECD and HMT 
investors to search for the extent of such transfers. In particular, every OECD-acquired firm 
is matched with a HMT-acquired firm and we look for changes in TFP between these two 
groups of firms in the post-acquisition period.  
We find that OECD-acquired firms outperform HMT-acquired firms. In particular, 
relative to HMT-acquired firms, OECD-acquired firms experience higher productivity in the 
initial year of acquisition and this productivity differential persists in subsequent years, 
reaching 24.5% in the third year. Further, post-acquisition increases in average wages 
accompanied by no changes in total employment and increases in capital usage per worker 
point to the introduction of management techniques that reduce labor inefficiencies along 
with capital deepening as likely sources of the TFP increase. 
These results suggest that the development level of the investor source country 
affects the opportunities for technology transfer differentially and underscore the 
importance of distinguishing between sources of FDI. Since evidence shows that OECD 
multinationals have superior technological capabilities relative to HMT multinationals, we 
could infer that Chinese firms are closer, with respect to capabilities, to HMT compared to 
OECD firms. The results can then be interpreted to imply that there are more opportunities 
for productivity improvement if the capability gap between acquirer and target are 
sufficiently large. This interpretation is akin to studies that relate absorptive capacity of 
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domestic firms to their ability to benefit from FDI spillovers, such as Blalock and Gertler 
(2009) who find that firms with smaller “technology gap” benefit less from FDI than those 
with weaker technological competencies. The results can also be interpreted as showing that 
ethnic ties do not necessarily lead to better firm performance, a finding also corroborated by 
Huang, Jin, and Qian (2010).  
Looking across industry groups, we further find that the productivity differential is 
most pronounced in industries with high domestic content. This finding has important 
policy implications for countries heavily engaged in export processing activities. If the local 
economy specializes in a narrow range of activities it makes it unlikely for productivity gains 
to materialize from foreign direct investment via the technology transfer channel. 
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________________________________________________________________________ 
3. FDI, Agglomeration Economies, and Productivity: 
Evidence from China 
______________________________________________________ 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The presence of foreign multinational companies (MNCs) in a country alters the 
economic landscape in which domestic enterprises operate. MNCs typically bring with them 
advanced technology that is believed to generate knowledge spillovers to domestic 
enterprises (Blomström and Kokko, 1998). However, foreign presence also tends to increase 
competition in input markets for skilled labor (Driffield and Taylor, 2000) as well as in 
output markets (Aitken and Harrison,1999). Increased competition for skilled labor could 
diminish the gains to domestic enterprises of locating in close proximity to own-industry 
activity (Combes and Duranton, 2006) while output market competition could generate 
negative market stealing effects. On the one hand, the presence of MNCs can strengthen the 
forces that attract domestic enterprises to locate in close proximity (localization economies) 
via increased opportunity for knowledge spillovers.46 On the other hand, the presence of 
MNCs can diminish the value of localization economies via increased competition for skilled 
labor, a phenomenon known as “labor poaching” as well as via negative competitive forces 
in output markets. This paper provides empirical evidence on the net effect between positive 
localization economies and negative competition forces arising in the presence of MNCs.  
The analysis is carried out by ranking enterprises and nearby activity, in ascending 
order of productivity, into state, private and foreign owned enterprises operating in China. 
                                                          
46 See Rosenthal and Strange (2004) for a survey of the empirical literature on agglomeration economies. 
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China provides a suitable setting due to a well-established productivity hierarchy among 
these three broad ownership types. On average, foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs) operating 
in China are more productive than their domestic counterparts; and among domestic-owned 
enterprises, the private-owned enterprises (POEs) are more productive compared to state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) (Wen, Li, Lloyd, 2002; Zhang, Zhang, Zhao, 2001).47 Ownership 
type of an enterprise embodies enterprise-specific assets such as technology, brand name, 
managerial know-how, local networks, etc. which are associated positively with 
productivity.48 Studies looking at how organization of economic activity within a city affects 
the value of agglomeration find that industrial structure and corporate organization are 
important determinants (Rosenthal and Strange, 2003 and 2008). Thus, there is reason to 
believe that the coexistence of various ownership types alters the opportunity and value of 
localization spillovers.  
This paper combines insights from the agglomeration literature and the study of 
spillovers from foreign direct investment (FDI), similar in spirit to Mayer et al (2010), to 
analyze interactions among enterprises within an industry-city space.49 This paper makes 
three contributions. First, the agglomeration literature posits location specific externalities to 
extend along three dimensions – spatial, industrial and temporal.50 However, firms may be 
                                                          
47 It is accepted as conventional wisdom that MNCs exhibit superior performance in comparison to domestic 
firms in many countries, not only in China. See Arnold and Javorcik (2009) for specific examples.  
48 See Syverson (2010) for a survey of firm-specific factors that affect productivity. 
49 Mayer et al (2010) analyze firm location decisions incorporating trade economists‟ views on why firms locate 
abroad and urban economists‟ views on inter-city location patterns.   
50 For example, using data on new firm births in the U.S., Rosenthal and Strange (2003) find that localization 
economies attenuate rapidly in the first few miles and then much slowly over longer distances. Using U.S. plant 
level data, Henderson (2003) finds that localization economies have a positive effect on plant level productivity 
in high tech industries but not in machinery industries. Henderson (2003) also finds that firms in high tech 
industries benefit from scale of past own industry activity. 
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„nearer‟ or „farther‟ from each other in a fourth dimension that may not be captured by 
industrial, physical, or temporal distance, namely technological distance. I organize 
enterprises by their ownership types capturing enterprise-specific assets that differ across 
enterprises albeit within the same industrial, geographic, and temporal space.51 This 
organization allows me to observe attenuation of localization spillovers as enterprise 
ownership structure becomes dissimilar. 
Second, empirical studies in the agglomeration literature are predominantly based in 
developed country settings. In most developed countries production units are privately 
owned and policy biases towards particular ownership types are absent. In contrast, the 
industrial ownership structure in developing countries, particularly in transition economies 
like China, differs substantially.52 The state has a significant presence and often enacts 
policies biased in favor of state-owned enterprises.53 In addition, governments are eager to 
attract foreign direct investment (FDI) leading to the coexistence of domestic and foreign 
enterprises, which differ from each other, notably in terms of productivity.  
China provides a unique setting to investigate heterogeneity in firms‟ responses to 
economic activity in own and across ownership types due to the coexistence of enterprises 
under various ownership structures.54 Since opening its economy in 1978, China‟s economic 
landscape has transformed from being entirely composed of thousands of state-owned 
enterprises to one shared by private-owned and foreign-owned enterprises. For instance, in 
                                                          
51 Rosenthal and Strange (2003) organize establishments by size and by subsidiary and non-subsidiary status to 
search for evidence of the importance of industrial structure and corporate organization, respectively. 
52 See Brandt, Rawski, Sutton (2008) for an overview of China‟s industrial development.  
53 See Huang (2003) for a discussion of policy biases against China‟s domestic private-owned enterprises. 
54 See Naughton (2007, p. 298 – 304) for details on the evolution of ownership types in China. 
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1980, state-owned enterprises accounted for 81% of industrial output and only 41% in 2005; 
private-owned and foreign-owned enterprises accounted for 27%  and 30% of total 
industrial output respectively in 2005 (Perkins and Rawski, 2008). Figure 3.1 shows a similar 
trend for employment. 
The third contribution is to the literature on foreign direct investment, which has 
extensively studied the spillover effects of foreign enterprises on their domestic 
counterparts. However, studies focusing on potential spillovers in the opposite direction, 
from domestic to foreign enterprises, are less common (some exceptions include Li, Liu, 
Parker, 2001 and Chang and Xu, 2008). Organizing enterprises by their ownership types 
permits a focus on interactions between foreign and domestic enterprises, allowing 
measurement of spillovers in both directions. Evidence of positive spillovers from domestic 
to foreign enterprises has policy implications for the importance of indigenous private 
enterprises in the market reform process in China.  
I estimate differences in the strength of localization spillovers within and across 
ownership types using enterprise level data on manufacturing enterprises operating in China 
during 1998-2006. The data comes from the Annual Surveys of Industrial Production.55 The 
dataset contains detailed information on the ownership structure of an enterprise in addition 
to enterprise level inputs and output. I estimate an augmented production function for 
enterprises in each type, including measures of intra-industry employment differentiated by 
ownership types within a city. In addition, the preferred specification includes industry and 
                                                          
55 The Annual Surveys of Industrial Production is not a plant level dataset. However, the majority of 
observations are of single-plant operations mitigating concerns about measurement error in the localization 
variables. See Section 4 for a detailed discussion. 
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city by year fixed effects to control for a range of industry specific and time varying city level 
characteristics that potentially impact enterprise level productivity.     
This paper offers three core results. First, within the same ownership type (own-
type), I find evidence of traditional localization economies consistent with a large literature 
on agglomeration economies. Second, across different ownership types (cross-type), 
spillovers differ in two ways. They tend to be much weaker compared to within ownership 
type spillovers. In addition, spillovers from more productive foreign to less productive 
domestic enterprises are smaller than spillovers in the reverse direction. This asymmetric 
pattern of spillovers is consistent with labor poaching at work in the presence of foreign 
multinational companies. Finally, I find positive productivity spillovers from domestic 
private-owned enterprises to all ownership types, suggesting the importance of this emerging 
group in the Chinese economy.   
As an additional exercise, I further decompose foreign enterprises into those 
originating from ethnically Chinese economies (ECEs) and those enterprises originating 
primarily from OECD countries (non-ECEs) allowing for the possibility of ethnic business 
networks influencing the value of localization economies.56 The basic patterns discussed 
above still persist, but the decomposition allows us to observe that private-owned 
enterprises benefit from the presence of non-ECEs while state-owned enterprises do not. 
Notably, I find that nearby activity in ECEs has no impact on productivity of non-ECEs and 
vice versa. This result offers preliminary evidence on relationships between MNCs, 
particularly between MNCs operating at different technology levels.  
                                                          
56
 Kerr (2008) provides evidence of knowledge diffusion through ethnic networks.  
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The paper is organized as follows.  Section 3.2 provides a conceptual framework for 
understanding why we would expect differences in localization spillovers within own and 
across different ownership types and develops a set of testable hypotheses. Section 3.3 
presents the empirical specification and discusses estimation issues.  Section 3.4 describes the 
data and measurement of key variables.  Section 3.5 presents the empirical findings and the 
final section concludes. 
 
3.2. Ownership Type and Differential Localization Spillovers 
Foreign-owned and domestic-owned enterprises in China have different productivity 
profiles. FOEs are more productive than POEs who are, in turn, more productive than 
SOEs, giving rise to a distinct productivity hierarchy. This productivity hierarchy has 
implications for the ability of enterprises to benefit from traditional localization economies 
(labor market pooling, input sharing, knowledge spillovers) and withstand negative 
competition for skilled labor (labor poaching).  
Evidence from the literature on spillovers from FDI emphasizes the importance of 
absorptive capacity of an enterprise to internalize potential spillovers.57 A common measure 
of absorptive capacity is a firm‟s distance to the industry‟s technology frontier.58 Using data 
on U.K. firms, Girma (2005) finds that the industry leaders are predominantly foreign firms 
and that spillovers increase with absorptive capacity but up to a threshold level beyond 
                                                          
57 The usage of the term absorptive capacity closely follows Cohen and Levinthal (1990) who describe it as the 
“ability to recognize value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends” (p.128). 
58 The distance is computed as the difference between the productivity of the industry leader(s) and the 
productivity of the individual firm. 
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which spillovers diminish. He also finds that there is a minimum absorptive capacity 
threshold level below which spillovers from FDI are very small or even negative.  
Appealing to the productivity hierarchy among the three ownership types in China, 
we make a set of assumptions about the absorptive capacity of enterprises in each type. First, 
we assume that of the three sources of traditional localization economies, strength of 
knowledge spillovers is most directly affected by an enterprise‟s absorptive capacity. FOEs 
are known to use more sophisticated technology and management strategies and thus, we 
expect knowledge spillovers to flow from FOEs to domestic-owned enterprises.  POEs, 
being generally more productive than SOEs, are expected to benefit more from foreign 
presence.59 Lastly, we expect SOEs to benefit from nearby presence of both FOEs and 
POEs. However, benefits from co-location with POEs are expected to be larger than that 
from foreign presence because the productivity gap between SOEs and POEs is smaller than 
that between SOEs and FOEs.  
The presence of foreign companies increases competition in both the domestic 
output and input markets. However, competition in the output market is less of a concern in 
this study.60 Typically, final output markets span larger geographic areas than cities such as 
the province where the company resides, other provinces, or overseas markets. In fact, a 
significant portion of inward FDI in China is export-oriented (Zhang, 2005). These foreign 
companies produce almost exclusively for export markets. This leads us to believe that 
within an industry-city space, competition in input markets is a more important outcome 
from foreign presence.  
                                                          
59 Hale and Long (2006) find that POEs in China benefit more from foreign presence than SOEs. 
60 See Aitken and Harrison (1999) for evidence of negative output market competition from FDI. 
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Input competition arises when an enterprise endowed with superior enterprise-
specific assets, therefore more productive, lures away skilled workers from its rivals by 
offering higher wages. This “labor poaching” assumes that higher skilled workers boost the 
productivity of firms to justify offering higher wages. Labor poaching diminishes the 
benefits from co-location (Combes and Duranton, 2006). Foreign firms, in general, are 
known to pay higher wages and there is some evidence that they attract the best workers 
away from domestic firms (Gorg, Strobl, Walsh, 2007). In China, Cai, Park, and Zhao (2008) 
find that the returns to education are higher in nonpublic enterprises. Zhao (2002) finds that 
unskilled workers earned significantly less in foreign-invested enterprises compared to those 
in the state sector while the opposite is true of skilled workers.  
 Although China‟s comparative advantage is in cheap, unskilled labor, it has a 
growing pool of skilled workers. For example, Yan (2010) writes in a recent article in China 
Daily that U.S. MNC, Pfizer, is making plans to open up a new R&D center in the city of 
Wuhan to tap into low cost, high skilled university-educated workers. Science parks are 
another example where MNCs tap into highly skilled workers from nearby research 
universities (Todo, Zhang, Zhou, 2009). Strong demand for skilled workers from foreign 
enterprises is reciprocated by a strong desire from workers to be employed at MNCs in 
China. Wall Street Journal correspondent Leslie Chang (2009) provides some anecdotal 
evidence. One of the workers she interviewed in the province of Guangdong succinctly 
relates that “American and European bosses treated workers best, followed by Japanese, 
Korean, Hong Kong, and then Taiwanese factory owners. Domestic Chinese factories were 
the worst, because they “always go bankrupt”.” (p. 27).  
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Taken together, we can expect to see asymmetry in the labor poaching effect - 
poaching would lead skilled workers to flow from less productive towards more productive 
enterprises. In the Chinese context, FOEs, endowed with superior firm-specific assets, 
would be able to successfully poach the high skilled workers away from domestic-owned 
enterprises by offering higher wages. Similarly, within the domestic-owned enterprises, 
POEs would have the ability to offers higher wages and entice skilled workers away from 
SOEs.  
To summarize the discussion above, Table 3.1 compiles the anticipated effects of 
nearby own-industry activity by ownership type on enterprise level productivity. The 
leftmost column indicates the ownership type of intra-industry activity and the topmost row 
indicates the ownership type of the sample of enterprises. We expect the diagonal terms to 
be positive and largest in each column since productivity distance between „sender‟ and 
„receiver‟ is smallest which implies that the influence of labor poaching is expected to be 
smallest. These own-type spillovers represent traditional localization economies.  
The cross-diagonal effects in the bottom left quadrant capture the effects of activity 
in higher productivity types on enterprises in lower productivity types. Localization 
spillovers could be positive or negative depending on the magnitude of the labor poaching 
effect, but we expect them to be smaller than own-type effects. The cross-diagonal effects in 
the top right quadrant capture the effects of activity in lower productivity types on 
enterprises in higher productivity types. Based on the above discussion, we can also expect 
these effects to be smaller than own-type spillovers. Knowledge spillovers are not expected 
to be the likely source of any localization economies since such spillovers are generally 
associated with more sophisticated technology which higher productivity enterprises employ. 
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The likely source of positive spillovers is input sharing including labor. A priori, the exact 
signs are unknown. However, enterprises in ownership types lower in the hierarchy are less 
likely to exert labor poaching forces on enterprises higher in the hierarchy. Therefore, we 
may expect these effects to be larger than those in the bottom left quadrant. 
 
3.3 Empirical Strategy and Estimation Issues 
To examine the relationship between manufacturing activity in different ownership 
types and enterprise productivity, I divide the data into three samples - state-owned, private-
owned and foreign-owned. Then, using enterprise level data, I estimate an augmented 
production function that includes measures of intra-industry employment within a city, 
differentiated by ownership types, as explanatory variables. The estimating equation is as 
follows61: 
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where        is measured as real value added,        is the total employment,        is the 
real fixed assets of enterprise  , under ownership type  , in industry  , city   at time  ; 
(    )   , (    )   , and (    )    represent intra-industry employment within a city at 
time   under state-owned, private-owned, and foreign-owned enterprise types respectively, 
                                                          
61 This equation is derived assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function for enterprise   and taking logs of:  
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where   is output,   is labor,   is capital, and   is a measure of intra-industry activity under each of the three 
ownership types ( ) , industry ( ), and city ( ) at time ( ).  
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and        is a white noise error term that captures idiosyncratic differences in enterprise 
level value added.  
An alternative strategy to (3.3.1) is to estimate the total factor productivity (TFP) for 
each enterprise and then regress enterprise level TFP on the agglomeration measures. The 
results are robust to this alternative and are provided in Appendix 3B and 3C, giving 
confidence that the results are not driven by specification of the production function. 
 
Estimation issues 
In estimating own and cross-type localization spillovers, there are four estimation 
issues of particular concern. First, selection bias is a likely issue in the Chinese context. The 
sample years coincide with a period of rapid privatization of state-owned enterprises. There 
might be concern that unproductive SOEs were disproportionately being privatized during 
this period so that relatively productive enterprises remained in the state-owned category. 
This selection could lead to a positive correlation between productivity of SOEs and 
economic activity under the three ownership types. In order to address such concerns, I 
estimate model (3.3.1) on a balanced panel of SOEs, constructed to include only those 
enterprises that were state-owned in 1998 and remained state-owned throughout the entire 
sample period.62  
The second concern is measurement error in the key variables of interest, intra-
industry employment within a city organized by ownership type. In the context of this study, 
measurement error arises when employment at a multi-plant firm is allocated to a particular 
                                                          
62 The definition used to designate enterprises as state-owned include shareholding limited and other limited 
types. These hybrid ownership forms emerged out of the state enterprise reform process and retain a 
significant amount of state control (Huang, 2008, p.13 -19). 
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location when in fact the employment is located across a number of different locations. The 
Annual Surveys of Industrial Production collects observations at the firm level.63 In 
principle, this creates ambiguity as to where a firm‟s workers are located and could therefore 
complicate efforts to measure the degree of employment agglomeration in a given location 
and industry. The ideal dataset instead would report establishment level data for which there 
would be no ambiguity with respect to the location of a company‟s workers.64 Fortunately, 
this issue turns out to be much less of a concern than might otherwise be feared.  
In China, more than 95% of all firms in the entire sample are single-plant firms 
(Brandt et al, 2009). Table 3.2 indicates that the number of multi-plant firms is decreasing 
over time. This trend can be explained by observing that SOEs have the largest share of 
multi-plant firms, as shown in Table 3.3, compared to private and foreign-owned enterprises. 
Beginning in the mid-nineties, the Chinese government aggressively privatized SOEs, leading 
to massive reorganization that decreased the number of SOEs and hence number of multi- 
plant firms. Table 3.3 shows that the share of employment represented by single-plant firms 
within each ownership type is lowest in SOEs. This implies that any measurement error issue 
will be more pronounced for measures of economic activity for the sample of state-owned 
enterprises compared to the other two ownership types.  
                                                          
63 There are two types of basic units used by statistical agencies in China. These are legal units and 
establishments. Legal units conform to the definition of an organization unit in the System of National 
Accounts (SNA) published by the United Nations. Establishments conform to the definition of establishments 
in SNA. The National Bureau of Statistics surveys legal units in the annual surveys. 
64 Lu (2008), for example, uses 1996 and 2001 establishment level data to study agglomeration patterns in 
China. 
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Robustness checks are carried out to test the sensitivity of the results to measures of 
agglomeration derived from employment in single-plant firms only. An additional check is 
carried out where localization measures using employment in single-plant firms and 
employment in multi-plant firms are included separately as explanatory variables. The basic 
patterns in the results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
The third estimation issue arises because there may be industry-, city-, and time- 
unobservable factors that the firm observes but the econometrician does not. To address 
time invariant omitted variables a full set of industry, city, and time dummies are included in 
(3.3.1) as follows:  
 
                                      
     (    )    
      
     (    )      
     (    )    
                                      (3.3.2) 
 
where    is a set of four digit industry dummies;    is a set of city dummies; and    is a set 
of year dummies and        is white noise.  
Each set of fixed effects controls for various types of unobservable variables that 
could affect enterprise level productivity. Industry dummies control for industry specific 
technology, skill requirements, and other industry specific common shocks. City dummies 
control for location specific natural resources, infrastructure and local policies. For example, 
several cities and parts of cities in China are designated as Special Economic Zones and 
other special economic areas such as Economic and Technological Development Area, Hi-
Technology Development Areas, and Export Processing Zones (Wang and Wei, 2008). 
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These areas were primarily set up to encourage interactions between foreign and domestic 
firms in the hopes of realization of positive externalities. Without city level controls or city 
dummies, effects of such policies on productivity would be incorrectly attributed to the 
localization variables. City dummies further absorb any aggregate employment or 
urbanization effect.  Time dummies control for macroeconomic shocks such as inflation, the 
Asian financial crisis, accession of China to the World Trade Organization (WTO), and 
other national shocks.  
Finally, after controlling for industry, city, and time specific unobservable variables it 
is still possible that time varying unobservables remain which are correlated with the error 
term. For example, policies set at the level of the central government that are implemented 
at different times at the city level will not be picked up by city fixed effects alone. In 
particular, privatization of state-owned enterprises is carried out at the level of the city 
government and the pace and time of implementation varies across cities and time. 
Controlling for city-time effects could also potentially capture the influence of unobservable 
variables that might be correlated with the error term but that might have drawn in talented 
entrepreneurs to a city. To address such concerns, city by year fixed effects replace city and 
year fixed effects in (3.3.2).  
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     (    )    
              (     )                            (3.3.3) 
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where       is a set of city by year dummies;    is a set of four digit industry dummies and 
       is white noise. This specification is the most demanding of the data and results from 
this model form the basis of discussion in Section 5. 
 
3.4 Data and Variables 
3.4.1 Data Description 
Data used in this study are drawn from Annual Surveys of Industrial Production 
conducted by the Chinese government‟s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The dataset 
includes a panel of all non-state owned firms whose annual sales exceed 5 million yuan 
(referred to as “above-scale” industrial firms) and all state-owned enterprises during 1998-
2006.65,66 The dataset contains detailed information on about hundred variables, including 
enterprise identification code, four-digit industry code, six-digit geographic administrative 
code, ownership type, gross industrial output value, value added, export value, total 
employment, capital stock, and intermediate inputs.  
The NBS classifies enterprises into 23 detailed ownership categories. Each enterprise 
is assigned a registration code at time of establishment designating its ownership type. These 
codes have been grouped into three broad categories for purposes of the study.67 The 
groupings were motivated by the well documented hierarchy in terms of average productivity 
                                                          
65 The NBS classifies non state-owned enterprises to include collectively-owned enterprises, Chinese 
indigenous privately-owned enterprises, and foreign-owned enterprises operating in China. The industry section 
of China Statistical Yearbook is compiled based on this dataset. Basic information of each four-digit industry in 
the China Markets Yearbook is also based on this dataset. 
66 5 million yuan amounts to approximately $US 600,000 over this period.  
67 State-owned enterprises (SOE): 110, 141, 143, 151, 159, 160; Private-owned enterprises (POE): 120, 130, 
142, 149, 171, 172, 173, 174, 190; Enterprises from ethnically Chinese economies of Hong Kong, Macao, and 
Taiwan (ECE): 210, 220, 230, 240; Enterprises from all other countries (non-ECE): 310, 320, 330, 340; 
Foreign-owned enterprises (FOE): ECE and non-ECE.  
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where foreign-owned enterprises are more productive than private-owned enterprises and 
who are in turn more productive than state-owned enterprises.  
Average characteristics by ownership type 
To compare characteristics between enterprises in the three ownership types, 
especially to see if the productivity hierarchy between ownership types is evident in the data, 
Table 3.4 presents results from running a simple descriptive regression. Six outcome 
variables for an enterprise  ,    - output, exporting value, labor productivity (value added 
per worker), new product output value per worker, wage, and capital per worker - are 
regressed on ownership (              ), two-digit industry (  ), and province (  ) 
dummies for each year in the sample, 1998 - 2006.  
 
    (  )                                           (3.4.1)  
 
Results indicate that on average, enterprises differ markedly by ownership type. 
FOEs are on average larger (in terms of gross output value), export more, are more 
productive, innovative, pay higher wages, and use more capital per worker compared to their 
domestic counterparts. Within the domestic-owned enterprises, POEs are on average more 
productive than SOEs providing evidence for the productivity hierarchy found in previous 
studies. For example, in 1998, FOEs were 259% and 30% more productive and paid 79% 
and 45% higher wages per worker compared to SOEs and POEs respectively. POEs were 
177% more productive and paid 23% higher wages per worker compared to SOEs.68 On 
                                                          
68 The percentage difference in any of the outcome variables between any two ownership types can be 
calculated from    as ,    (   (  )   )-. 
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average, the private-owned were also larger and more innovative than state-owned 
enterprises. 
SOEs are consistently more capital intensive compared to POEs. This is consistent 
with evidence of the state-sector becoming concentrated in large, capital-intensive firms as 
the reform process continues (Naughton, 2007, p. 301 – 304). The higher wage trend at 
POEs relative to SOEs is visible except for the last three years in the sample. This is 
suggestive of SOEs becoming more market oriented towards the end of the sample period. 
In general, we observe a declining trend in the differences between enterprises in the three 
broad ownership types. 
 
3.4.2 Key Variables 
Productivity 
Under the augmented production function approach real firm value added is regressed on 
labor, real capital, and localization measures. The dataset provides information on nominal 
value added that is converted to real terms using the Brandt-Rawski two-digit industry 
output deflators (Brandt, Biesebroeck, Zhang, 2005).69  
Under the alternative specification, enterprise level productivity is regressed on 
measures of nearby own-industry activity. Productivity is measured using a semi-parametric 
method proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996).70 Details on this method are provided in 
Appendix 3A. 
Localization economies 
                                                          
69 The deflators are available at http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/public/N07057/CHINA/appendix/. 
70 Carried out using the Stata module opreg (Yasar, Raciborski, Poi, 2008). 
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        ∑                                   (3.4.2.1) 
 
where                 is total employment summed over all enterprises   in the same 
industry   and city  , at time   as enterprise   but excluding  , for each ownership type   (  
= SOE, POE, FOE).  
Information on location of an enterprise is crucial for construction of the 
localization variables. The dataset provides information on the six digit county codes where 
the first two digits represent the province, the second two the city, and finally the last two 
digits designate the county. China‟s administrative boundaries change often so that county 
codes, the most disaggregated level of geography, also change over the sample period.71 To 
ensure consistency over time, county codes for all enterprises were matched and recoded 
against one benchmark system. The benchmark system adopted was the set of 2873 county 
codes used in the 2000 China County Population Census Data.72  
In addition to ownership and location information, we need to distinguish 
enterprises by industry. The dataset provides information on four-digit manufacturing 
industries according to the Chinese Industrial Classification (CIC) system. CIC codes were 
readjusted and renumbered in 2003.73 Consequently, industry codes were adjusted for years 
prior to 2003 ensuring that codes are comparable across the sample period.   
                                                          
71 See Lu and Tao (2009) for a discussion about this issue. 
72 The 2000 China County Population Census Data was purchased from the China Data Center at the 
University of Michigan. 
73 Prior to 2003, NBS followed GB/T 4754 - 1994 industry classification system and 2003 onwards GB/T 4754 
- 2002 was adopted. Two changes were made in the 2 digit divisions: (i) the 1994 division 39 (“Arms and 
Ammunition Manufacturing”) was added to 2002 division 36 (“Special Equipment Manufacturing”). Then the 
remaining 2002 division codes were renumbered accordingly i.e. 1994 division 40 corresponds to 2002 division 
39, 1994 division 41 corresponds to 2002 division 40, 1994 division 42 corresponds to 2002 division 41, and 
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3.5 Results 
In Tables 3.5 – 3.11, separate panels present the results for each sample.74 Two 
columns are reported for each sample. The first column presents results from model (3.3.2) 
which includes a full set of four-digit industry, city, and year dummies. The second column 
presents results from model (3.3.3) which includes four-digit industry and city by year 
dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the four-digit industry level. I focus on results in 
column (2) for each sample in the discussion below, as these are the most demanding of the 
data.    
   
3.5.1 Localization Spillovers by Ownership Type 
Table 3.5 presents the main results. The key pattern observed is that localization 
spillovers attenuate as enterprises become more dissimilar. For each sample, localization 
spillovers are positive and largest from nearby own-type activity, except for the sample of 
state-owned enterprises, which is discussed shortly. For the sample of state-owned 
enterprises, we observe that a doubling of employment in nearby own-type activity increases 
productivity by 1.10%; for the sample of private and foreign-owned enterprises the 
magnitude of the own-type effect is 1.90% and 1.40% respectively. To gain perspective on 
the magnitude of these positive spillover effects, I compare them to localization spillovers 
found in the U.S. by Henderson (2003), who studies the impact of own-industry activity on 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1994 division 43 corresponds to 2002 division 42 (ii) 2002 division 43 (“Waste Resources and Old Material 
Recycling and Processing”) was added which was not part of manufacturing in the previous period. 
74 All results exclude Industry 16 “Tobacco Products Processing” since close to 100% of the enterprises 
operating in this industry is state-owned. 
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establishment level productivity. Henderson‟s (2003) estimates of the elasticities of own-
industry activity are in the range of 0.012 to 0.021.75 The elasticities of own-type intra-
industry activity fall within this range and attest to the presence of traditional localization 
economies typically found in the agglomeration literature. 
As hypothesized earlier, we find that cross-type spillovers are smaller compared to 
own-type spillovers. Foreign presence confers spillovers of much smaller magnitude on both 
POEs and SOEs relative to own-type spillovers for each sample. The coefficient on the 
foreign localization variable is similar in magnitude for both the state-owned and private-
owned samples although it fails to attain significance at conventional levels for the former.  
For the state-owned sample, the presence of private-owned enterprises offers double 
the productivity boost of enterprises in its own type. This is contrary to the idea of 
attenuation as enterprises become dissimilar in their technology levels. We expect own-type 
spillovers to be largest and POEs to exert labor poaching forces on SOEs. This is suggestive 
of the role of absorptive capacity at work. Since the productivity distance between state-
owned and private-owned enterprises is smaller relative to the distance between state-owned 
and foreign-owned enterprises, SOEs are hypothesized to better absorb spillovers 
originating from POEs. Still, the magnitude of the spillover is puzzling.   
There is evidence showing that SOEs often outsource their production activities to 
POEs, particularly collective-owned enterprises (Jefferson and Rawski, 1999), which may 
explain the significantly large positive effect from POEs.76 Although, POEs may lure away 
                                                          
75 Henderson (2003) measures nearby activity as the number of own industry plants in a U.S. county for 
machinery and high tech industries. 
76 Collective owned-enterprises (COEs) are factories that are nominally owned by the workers in the enterprise 
but controlled by local governments (Banister, 2005).  
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skilled workers, SOEs are able to tap into the skilled labor pool via outsourcing 
arrangements.  
To explore this idea further, I estimate model (3.3.3) for the sample of SOEs only, 
excluding collective-owned enterprises from the measure of localization economies in the 
private-owned type. The results are displayed in Table 3.6. Column (1) includes intra-
industry employment within a city at POEs excluding employment at COEs; column (2) 
includes an additional measure of intra-industry employment within a city at COEs as a 
separate explanatory variable. Results indicate that even after removing COEs from the 
measure of localization represented by the private-owned type, POEs confer strong positive 
spillovers on SOEs that are larger than own-type localization spillovers.  
 Cross-type spillovers, originating from lower to higher productivity enterprises, are 
also smaller compared to own-type spillovers. As noted earlier, we expect these effects to be 
smaller than own-type spillovers and more likely larger than spillovers from higher to lower 
productivity enterprises due to smaller likelihood of negative labor poaching forces. Activity 
in SOEs appears to have no effect on the productivity of private and foreign-owned 
enterprises. SOEs rank lowest in terms of productivity and workers tend to be older, less 
educated, have less foreign work experience, and get lower wages in comparison to the 
domestic private sector (Hale and Long, 2008). Therefore, it is reasonable to find that SOEs 
do not confer localization spillovers to their neighbors. Activity in POEs confers strong, 
positive spillovers on both SOEs and FOEs. The spillover effect on FOEs is larger than 
spillovers in the reverse direction. 
Results on cross-type spillovers, both from foreign to domestic enterprises and from 
domestic to foreign enterprises, together support the hypothesis that labor poaching 
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diminishes the value of localization spillovers. In the absence of labor poaching, we would 
expect all cross-type spillovers to be of similar magnitudes. 
One particular result that stands out is the impact of employment at private-owned 
enterprises. Results in Tables 3.5 – 3.11 indicate that POEs exert positive spillovers on 
enterprises under all ownership types. POEs are the fastest growing segment in China in 
terms of employment (see Figure 1) despite facing several financial and regulatory policy 
biases.77 Private ownership is an essential ingredient in moving towards a market oriented 
economy.  Positive spillovers from POEs underline their importance in the transition of the 
Chinese economy towards a market-oriented environment.  
 
3.5.2 Differences by Source of Foreign Investment 
To further tease out the nuances in cross-type spillovers, Table 3.7 divides foreign-
owned enterprises into enterprises originating from ethnically Chinese economies of Hong 
Kong, Macao, and Taiwan (ECEs) and enterprises from all other countries but dominated by 
the U.S., European Union and Japan (non-ECEs).78 This further stratification of ownership 
types allows us to consider the role of ethnic business networks facilitating localization 
spillovers. 
ECEs and non-ECEs have different motivations for locating in China. Investors 
from ethnically Chinese economies primarily engage in export-oriented FDI, locating in 
China to tap into the large and cheap source of labor to carry out production for export 
                                                          
77 See Huang (2008) who argues that a political pecking order exists in China where state-owned firms have 
been favored by the Chinese government over firms in the domestic private-owned sector.  
78 Between 1979-1999, the US, EU, and Japan together accounted for half of the FDI originating from non-
ethnically Chinese economies (Zhang, 2005).  
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markets. On the other hand, investors from non-ethnically Chinese economies primarily 
engage in market-oriented FDI, locating in China to access the large domestic markets 
(Zhang, 2005). Foreign enterprises producing for the domestic market are more likely to 
source intermediate inputs from other domestic enterprises strengthening the opportunity 
for positive spillovers. Export-oriented foreign enterprises are more likely to source 
intermediate inputs from the parent company restricting the opportunity for interactions 
with domestic enterprises. Therefore, non-ECEs producing for the domestic market are 
more likely to interact with domestic enterprises compared to ECEs. 
Foreign-owned and domestic-owned enterprises also have different cultural profiles 
that can impact the absorptive capacity of an enterprise.79 Within the FOEs operating in 
China, there are distinct cultural differences between ECEs and non-ECEs relative to the 
host country. ECEs share cultural and linguistic ties with China, as well as family and 
business ties. Non-ECEs are primarily from OECD countries who do not share cultural or 
language similarities with China. Shared culture can facilitate communication and 
transactions with local businesses. From a domestic enterprise‟s perspective it may be „easier‟ 
to learn from ECEs compared to non-ECEs due to cultural similarities.     
The general patterns observed in Table 3.5 still persist. Own-type spillovers are the 
largest while cross-type spillovers are much smaller with spillovers from foreign to domestic 
enterprises being smaller than those in the reverse direction. Additionally, we observe that 
spillovers from foreign enterprises to POEs are found to originate from non-ECEs only. 
Since ECEs primarily engage in export processing activities, domestic-owned enterprises 
                                                          
79 I refer to cultural differences as encompassing differences in language and ethnicity in particular although it 
could also include culture in the sense of Saxenian (1996). However, corporate culture in the Saxenian sense is 
difficult to measure, so I focus on observable differences in enterprises by their country of origin. 
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may have fewer opportunities to interact with them as explained above. In contrast, the 
market orientation of non-ECE investment increases the likelihood of interaction with 
domestic enterprises. There is some evidence of negative spillovers from non-ECEs to 
SOEs, although lacking statistical significance under the preferred specification in column 2.   
 The novel result revealed in this table is that ECEs and non-ECEs virtually have no 
impact on each other. This is particularly surprising since the respective own-type spillovers 
are positive, statistically significant, and of similar magnitude. Because these regressions 
include controls for industries, cities, and time we cannot attribute the results to any inter-
city or inter-industry differences. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to explain the 
apparent lack of interaction between enterprises in these two foreign ownership types, I 
offer a few preliminary suggestions. Ethnic business networks might be a strong candidate in 
explaining why ECEs appear to interact only with other ECEs. Managers and workers in 
ECEs share a common language and close cultural ties that would facilitate economic 
transactions, in addition to being engaged in processing export activities.  
However, the absence of spillovers from non-ECEs to ECEs cannot be attributed to 
cultural differences alone since non-ECEs experience positive spillovers from POEs despite 
the absence of common culture or language. Zero spillovers in the opposite direction, ECEs 
to non-ECEs, might be a facet of the export driven orientation of ECE investment. 
Availability of FDI data by country of origin for non-ECEs would shed further light on this 
result. For example, Todo, Zhang, Zhou (2009), using detailed data from a large high 
technology park in Beijing, find that Japanese MNCs do not have any productivity 
improving spillovers on domestic Chinese firms. The authors attribute this to the small size 
of the highly educated and the overseas educated labor employed by Japanese MNCs. 
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3.5.3 Robustness Checks 
3.5.3.1 Single-Plant Firms Only 
To address concerns about measurement error in the localization variables, I 
reconstruct the localization variables to include employment in single-plant firms only. I also 
exclude multi-plant firms from each sample before re-estimating model (3.3.2). The results 
are displayed in Tables 3.8 – 3.11. Table 3.8 includes measures of localization using 
employment in single-plant firms only. Table 3.9 further divides foreign-owned enterprises 
into ECEs and non-ECEs. Tables 3.10 and 3.11 mirror Tables 3.8 and 3.9 respectively, 
except that they also include localization measures using employment in multi-plant firms 
only as separate explanatory variables in addition to measures of localization using 
employment in single-plant firms only. All four tables display results for the augmented 
production function approach. Column (1) presents results from model (3.3.2) which 
includes a full set of four-digit industry, city, and year dummies. Column (2) presents results 
from model (3.3.3) which includes four-digit industry and city by year dummies. I focus on 
results in column (2) for each sample in the discussion below.  
In general, the results attest to the robustness of own-type spillovers being larger 
than cross-type localization spillovers. The results also attest to the persistent positive 
spillovers from POEs to enterprises in all other ownership types. The absence of spillovers 
between ECEs and non-ECEs remain. However, I find no statistically significant cross-type 
spillovers from foreign-owned to domestic-owned enterprises except in Table 3.11, where 
negative spillovers from non-ECEs to SOEs become statistically significant. Positive 
productivity spillovers from SOEs to foreign enterprises also gain statistical significance in 
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Tables 3.8 – 3.11. After separating foreign enterprises into ECEs and non-ECEs, this effect 
is visible for the sample of non-ECEs only. This is surprising since non-ECEs are the most 
technologically superior and productive group while SOEs rank the lowest. Lower 
productivity is posited to be associated with lower skilled workers and inferior technology, 
so the labor pooling and knowledge spillover channels are unlikely to explain this result. The 
likely candidate would be input sharing. 
 
3.5.3.2 Controlling for Output Market Competition 
Previous studies, such as Aitken and Harrison (1999), find that foreign presence is 
negatively correlated with domestic-owned enterprise productivity due to a negative market 
stealing effect. This possibility may raise concerns that the smaller spillovers to domestic-
owned enterprises from foreign-owned enterprises are being driven by output market 
competition instead of labor poaching as hypothesized in this study. This section considers 
the possibility that negative output market competition is driving the observed pattern of 
results by controlling for local competition.  
I re-estimate model (3.3.3) including proxies for local competition within an 
industry-city space. The results are reported in Table 3.12. Competition is measured as the 
total number of firms in an industry within a city, differentiated by ownership types. State-
owned enterprises are counted as a single enterprise since there is a single owner, the 
Chinese government. The results indicate that even after controlling for local competition 
the basic patterns observed in Table 3.5 still persist. Competition from POEs is found to 
have a positive impact on enterprise level productivity controlling for overall scale of activity 
in an industry-city space. This is consistent with existing evidence (Glaeser, Kallal, 
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Scheinkman, Shleifer, 1992; Rosenthal and Strange, 2003) that finds local competition to 
enhance growth. Competition from FOEs only impacts productivity of FOEs positively 
while the effect is statistically insignificant for domestic-owned enterprises.   
 
3.5.4. Estimated Magnitude of Labor Poaching  
Using estimates of own and cross-type spillovers, I conduct a simple exercise to offer 
indirect evidence for the size of the labor poaching effect. I have argued that own-type 
spillovers primarily reflect traditional localization spillovers. Cross-type spillovers, 
particularly those from foreign to domestic-owned enterprises, are weakened by labor 
poaching forces. We can difference own and cross-type spillovers to arrive at a range of 
estimates for the negative labor poaching effect. The coefficients of interest are those 
spillovers originating from high to low productivity enterprises in Table 3.5, notably 
spillovers from foreign to domestic-owned enterprises. Differencing yields elasticities of -
0.011 and -0.017 respectively.80 Implicitly, it is assumed that the strength of localization 
spillovers would be similar in the absence of differences between firms by ownership types. 
This exercise suggests that the labor poaching effects can be as large as own-type spillovers. 
Chinese policy makers interested in attracting FDI should be cautioned by the potential for 
labor poaching to diminish desired spillovers from foreign multinational companies. 
 
3.6. Conclusions 
The empirical agglomeration literature finds robust evidence of benefits arising from 
the proximity to nearby own-industry activity. However, these benefits have previously not 
                                                          
80     
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been considered to vary along the ownership dimension of an enterprise, particularly in the 
context of a transition economy. Meanwhile, the literature on foreign direct investment has 
paid particular attention to benefits arising to domestic firms from the proximity to foreign 
firms. However, spillovers in the reverse direction are less well examined. This paper 
addresses these gaps.  
Using data on manufacturing enterprises operating in China during 1998-2006, this 
study estimates and offers explanations as to why localization spillovers might vary by 
ownership type of an enterprise. Exploiting a well-established productivity hierarchy in 
China, where foreign-owned enterprises are more productive compared to private-owned 
enterprises who are in turn more productive than state-owned enterprises, I find evidence of 
attenuation of localization spillovers as enterprises become more dissimilar in their 
productivity levels. In particular, the pattern of results is consistent with conflicting forces of 
positive agglomeration economies and negative labor poaching at work in the presence of 
foreign multinational companies. 
In addition, I find evidence of positive localization spillovers from private-owned 
enterprises to enterprises in all other ownership types. This finding underscores the 
important role of indigenous private enterprises in the Chinese economy and points towards 
the possibility of larger productivity spillovers in the absence of domestic policy biases 
against domestic private-owned enterprises. 
Finally, I find that within the foreign-owned sector, own-industry activity in 
enterprises originating from ethnically Chinese economies within a city has virtually no 
impact on the productivity of enterprises originating primarily from OECD countries and 
vice versa. This result points to the role of ethnic business networks facilitating localization 
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spillovers and warrants further research to understand interactions among multinational 
corporations. 
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________________________________________________________________________ 
4. Evolving Property Rights and Shifting Organization 
Forms: Evidence From Joint-Venture Buyouts Following 
China’s WTO Accession 
______________________________________________________ 
 
4.1 Introduction 
A remarkable flowering of research has shed light on the rapidly changing 
international organization of production.  As reviewed by Helpman (2006), this research has 
greatly expanded our understanding of why firms outsource, whether they source 
intermediate inputs domestically or from a foreign trading partner, and whether they choose 
to procure the inputs through arm‟s length transactions or to produce the components 
within the firm‟s boundaries.  With extensive reliance on foreign-funded enterprises in its 
export sector and detailed trade data, China has proved to be a useful testing ground for 
some of these new theories and observations.  Feenstra and Hanson (2005) use Chinese 
trade data to test hypotheses from the property rights theory against observed propensities 
to process inputs under alternative arrangements of ownership and control over imported 
inputs.  Fernandes and Tang (2010) extend this work by introducing firm heterogeneity as an 
additional determinant of vertical integration in export processing.  
We also test the ability of incomplete contracts and property rights theory to aid our 
understanding of firm‟s organizational choices in China.  Rather than focus on vertical 
integration and export processing, however, we study the incentive problems guiding 
multinational firms‟ organizational choices when engaged in horizontal FDI.  Our 
presumption is that substantial changes to Chinese law and policy in 1999 and China‟s 2001 
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accession to the World Trade Organization enhanced the ability of foreign firm to produce 
and sell in China as wholly owned subsidiaries rather than as joint ventures.  We adapt the 
Feenstra-Hanson (2005) property rights model to predict how the characteristics of an 
ongoing equity joint venture determine the surplus value derived from alternative 
organizational form.  The theory predicts that higher productivity and higher value added, 
but a lower domestic sales share, increase the probability that a joint venture will become a 
wholly foreign owned subsidiary rather than remain an EJV.  The theory also predicts that 
enterprises with lower productivity but higher value added and domestic sales share are more 
likely to be acquired by their Chinese partners rather than remain an EJV.   
We test these theoretical predictions using newly created enterprise-level panel data 
on equity joint ventures and changes in registration type after 2000.  We estimate a 
multinomial logit model of organization choice, with our choice of regressors closely 
matched to the theory. Our empirical results provide strong support for the property rights 
model and for the view that changes in Chinese policies have led to predictable changes in 
multinational organizational strategies. 
 
4.2. Chinese Regulation and the Changing Integration Strategy of Foreign Firms in 
China 
Deng Xiaoping‟s famous Southern Tour of January 1992 ushered in large flows of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) to mainland China. Even though wholly owned foreign 
enterprises (WFOEs) were permitted outside of Special Economic Zones by the 1986 Law 
on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises, most of the foreign investment entering China 
during the 1990s took the form of Sino-foreign joint ventures (SFJVs) (Cheung, 2007). As 
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shown by Figure 4.1(a), funds entering China for joint ventures exceeded funds entering for 
wholly owned operations until at least 1998 (using contracted FDI) and, as shown in Figure 
4.1(b), probably until 1999 (using actually utilized FDI).  The period from Deng‟s tour until 
1997 was one of substantial FDI liberalization, with substantial preferences given for foreign 
firms to engage in joint ventures with indigenous enterprises.  While Huang (2003) focuses 
on why international production integration with China took the form of FDI rather than 
contractual arrangements common in the take-off phase of other East Asian economies, it is 
equally noteworthy that this FDI took the form of joint ventures rather than WFOEs.   
Policies of the central and provincial governments surely are part of the explanation 
for the dominance of joint ventures during the 1990s. Although WFOEs were permitted in 
many sectors and offered similar incentives, foreign firms report barriers to establishing 
wholly owned subsidiaries ranging from substantial delays in approval to vigorous 
suggestions for local partners.81   Wholly owned enterprises were not permitted in 
“strategically important” infrastructure, such as nuclear power plants, but they were also 
essentially barred from projects in aerospace, automobiles, chemicals, defense, medical 
institutions, petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, printing and publications, shipping, satellite 
communications, soft drinks, and tourism.82  On the other hand, SFJVs enjoyed access to 
special economic and development zones, preferential tax treatment, and access to sectors 
where WFOEs were not permitted.  Yan and Warner (2002) emphasize the differences by 
concluding that “at the inception of economic reforms the Chinese government intentionally 
                                                          
81 Some of the restricted sectors required Chinese partners within SFJVs to hold a majority share.    
82 See Foreign Investment Administration (1998). 
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packaged EJVs with preferential privileges, while granting WFOEs virtually nothing but 
regulations (p.141). 
In addition to policies that favored joint ventures, foreign investors may have 
preferred them to wholly owned subsidiaries for reasons specific to Chinese governance and 
market development.83  First, the Chinese government at that time was ambivalent toward 
the rule of law, offering seeing the law as an instrument of the state.  Regulatory and 
unwritten policy changes, for instance, offer trumped laws in the administration of foreign 
claims.  A Chinese partner could be helpful in understanding and anticipating these changes.  
Secondly, the Chinese state lacked institutional capacity, due to fragmentation, overlapping 
jurisdiction, lack of cooperation, and corruption.  Again, a Chinese partner could be helpful 
solving local regulatory and procurement problems.  Finally, exchange in China is anchored 
by informal social ties.  Relational contracting in Chinese societies focuses on guanxi to the 
extent that, according to Clarke et al (2008, p. 407), “discussion of guanxi links not only 
relations among entrepreneurs but also relations between entrepreneurs and government 
officials.”84  Many companies find that a local partner helps nurture local customers, gain 
access to marketing and distribution networks as well as government connections (Sutter, 
2000). 
Indigenous firms also may have preferred a foreign partner to going it alone.  As 
forcefully argued by Haggard and Huang (2008), indigenous private entrepreneurs in the 
1990s were largely credit constrained and often entered into joint venture agreements to gain 
access to capital and to circumvent substantial restrictions imposed on the development of 
                                                          
83 See Wang (2001, ch. 3) for an overview of the legal framework for FDI. 
84 See Bian (1994) for a definition and discussion of guanxi, or interpersonal relationships, in China.  
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the private sector but not on foreign investors.  In this view, Chinese policy “followed the 
unusual course of favoring foreign private investors over domestic ones (p. 363).”   
 By the late nineties policies that influenced the organizational form chosen by both 
foreign and indigenous investors seem to have changed.  By 2000, the majority of inward 
FDI took the form of wholly foreign-owned investment (see Figure 4.1(b))85. Locating the 
exact source of this dramatic take-off in WFOEs is difficult and is probably attributable to a 
convergence of domestic policy changes.  First, in 1999, the Chinese Constitution was 
amended to sanction a larger role for nonpublic sector enterprises and to recognize the 
legitimacy of interest and dividend income.  Secondly, in the same year a new, unified 
Contract Law was promulgated granting natural individuals, not just legal persons, the ability 
to enter into legally enforceable contracts and giving oral contracts a stronger legal footing.  
According to Clarke et al (2008, p. 406), this “principle of freedom of contract signals a 
definitive move away from the planned economy.”  They also report that court records from 
Nanjing from 1999 to 2001 show “private enterprises entering into legally enforceable 
contracts and enjoying recourse to the courts – features of contract regime that were absent 
through the early 1990s (p. 406).” 
Perhaps as importantly, in 1999 China and the United State reached a bilateral 
agreement clearing the way for China‟s accession to the WTO in 2001.  WTO entry 
improved the rule of law and the property rights of foreign investors in many ways.  Perhaps 
most importantly, WTO accession eliminated many restrictions placed on WFOEs that were 
not also placed on other forms of investments.  Perhaps most notable in this regard are the 
                                                          
85 Data on utilized FDI inflow is unavailable prior to 1997. Figure 1(b) plots contracted FDI inflows by 
registration type between 1992 and 1999 illustrating the declining trend in joint ventures, the increasing trend in 
wholly foreign owned by 1999 and the spike in inflows in 1993. 
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elimination of export requirements for WFOEs and the granting of rights to engage in 
distribution and after-sales service.  Both of these changes expand local market access for 
these foreign owned firms.  WTO accession also brings external commitment to China‟s 
evolving property rights, as emphasized by Tang and Wei (2009).  Tang and Wei quote a 
recent U.S. Government Accounting Office report as noting that in its accession 
negotiations, China has “made a substantial number of important, specific commitments in 
the rule-of-law-related areas of transparency, judicial review, uniform enforcement of legal 
measures, and nondiscrimination in its commercial policy.”86 
 Despite amendment to its Constitution and accession to the WTO, contract 
enforcement in China is far from certain.  Despite recent developments, according to Clarke 
et al, “Contract Law and the courts still play a minor role in underpinning exchange 
agreements.”  They do, however, cite new evidence that despite the role of social networks, 
formal, written contracts have become the norm in business agreements.  Of particular note, 
a World Bank (2001) study finds that written contracts were used for 90% of contracts with 
clients and 82% with suppliers.  Nevertheless, Clarke et al conclude that “the Chinese legal 
system does not provide a secure system of property rights (p. 399). 
 What emerges from a review of the evolving legal basis for contractual enforcement 
of property rights is that incomplete contracts remain a significant feature of investing in 
China.  However, substantial changes to domestic laws culminating in amendment of the 
Chinese constitution and completion of bilateral agreements for WTO accession in 1999 
fundamentally altered the Chinese business landscape.  The dramatic take-off of WFOEs as 
                                                          
86 Tang and Wei (2009) citing GAO-05-53-2004. 
 74 
 
an investment vehicle observed in the aggregate FDI data, in this light, is a response by 
foreign investors to changes in the benefits of this organization form over the SFJV.   
 Testing the importance of incomplete contracts and changes in property rights to the 
organization choices of multinational firms is difficult.  We do not observe projects prior to 
inception, often lack detailed information on parents, and do not know the set of options 
actually considered by the firm.  We propose an alternative approach, based on observations 
of equity joint ventures established prior to the substantial reforms of 1999.  These ongoing 
enterprises experienced the same liberalization as did potential investors, permitting changes 
in organization form that, if consideration of incomplete contracts and property rights 
theory is useful, should occurs in ways that we can predict.  Such a test adds to a still small, 
but growing, body of research that seeks empirical evidence on the role of formal and 
informal institutions in the international organization of production.  We turn now to a 
theoretical model of organizational choice in the presence of imperfect contracts. 
 
4.3 A Property Rights Model of Organizational Form in China 
We consider the options facing the foreign and domestic partners of an equity joint 
venture operating in China.  Our framework is based on the Feenstra and Hanson (2005) 
model (hereafter the FH model), which applies the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights 
theory to export-processing firms in China.87  The FH model centers on the use of control 
rights to ameliorate holdup problems created by incomplete contracts.  Our adaptation 
retains their original emphasis on partners‟ responses to imperfect contracts but it shifts the 
focus away from export processing and toward the use of advanced technology in China by 
                                                          
87 The model draws on foundation provided by Hart (1995), Hart and Moore (1990) and Grossman and Hart 
(1986). 
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firms serving local markets.  The FH framework is well suited to our purpose as it permits 
easily interpretable expressions for the project‟s surplus value under alternative 
organizational forms and to predict how these relationships evolve as a consequence of 
strengthened property rights. 
 
4.3.1. Production and Effort 
 We consider the interaction of a foreign partner, f, and a domestic Chinese partner, s, 
who join to produce a good in China using foreign technology, local production labor, and 
local marketing services.  Surplus from the project is divided by ex-post Nash bargaining.  
The project requires the application of foreign technology (proprietary designs, processes, or 
customized equipment) to local labor, with output marketed to local Chinese customers. 
Foreign technology is contributed by the foreign partner. Local production may be 
controlled by either the foreign or the Chinese partner while domestic marketing services 
must be performed by the Chinese partner.  Timing is standard: in period 0 the partners 
decide who will own the firm and who will control production; in period 1 the partners 
simultaneously make effort investments; and in period 2 the partners carry out production 
and final sales.   
 Although our model is derived from Feenstra and Hanson (2005), we shape it to 
reflect the issues central to a foreign investor‟s choice of organizational structure.  While 
Chinese law assigns firm control and residual property rights in proportion to partner‟s 
equity shares, in practice, equity shares are not a guide to ownership and control.88  Equity 
shares are often based on non-market valuations and, in any case, do not reflect the outside 
                                                          
88 See the extensive interviews with joint venture partners in Wang (2001) and the extensive descriptions in 
Huang (2003, 2008). 
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options facing each partner and, hence, bargaining power within the partnership.89  We 
assume that when the partners choose an organization form for their activities, they choose 
the partner who will have rights to residual profits and the partner who will control 
production.  If ownership and control are split, we assume that both partners make equity 
investments and the organization is registered as a joint venture.  If ownership and control 
reside with a single partner, only one partner makes an equity investment and the 
organization is registered as a wholly-owned foreign enterprise or a wholly-owned domestic 
enterprise.  Organizational form is chosen to maximize the surplus from the project, given 
effort levels by each partner when surplus is divided through Nash bargaining.90 
 A second deviation from the FH model structure is that we shift focus away from 
input processing and input search effort and toward the use of advanced technology and the 
adaptation of local production processes to that technology.  For example, in a joint venture 
created to produce industrial boilers, the foreign partner may exert effort adapting 
proprietary boiler specifications for local customers while the Chinese partner adapts local 
production processes to the advanced designs.  Greater effort by each partner increases the 
surplus from the project.   
 Third, we deviate from FH by focusing our attention on the domestic Chinese 
market rather than on export sales, although we control for the export intensity of the firm 
in our empirical work. While export sales remain an important source of revenue for SFJVs, 
                                                          
89 Sutter (2000) notes that equity stake does not necessarily equal managerial control, but rather that control 
rests in the JV contract and the choice of partner.  She notes that with properly structured contracts, a foreign 
firm can get as much managerial control in an EJV as they get in a WFOE (p15-16.) 
90 Although SFJVs may have state-affiliated Chinese partners, Haggard and Huang (2008) argue that these firms 
are private, not state, firms.  This view is reflected in our assumption that surplus division occurs within the 
partnership. 
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local sales are as important as export sales for investors outside East Asia and in certain 
sectors.  For example, among U.S. manufacturing majority-owned non-bank affiliates in 
China, 67.4% of sales in 2005 were to the local market, and local sales accounted for more 
than 85% of total sales in food, chemicals, and transport equipment.   Japanese majority-
owned affiliates, which are more deeply engaged in export-platform FDI in China than are 
U.S. multinationals, made 53.6% of their total sales in 2005 to the local Chinese market.91  
Consistently, local market barriers for wholly foreign firms and implicit preferences for 
domestic firms by state-affiliated customers are mentioned in the business literature as a 
factor tilting foreign investors toward a joint venture as a means of entry into the Chinese 
market during the 1990s.  For example, Karen Sutter, director of Business Advisory Services 
at the US-China Business Council, notes that by 2000 WFOEs had emerged as a popular 
investment form, yet she still advises foreign investors that “An EJV offers several potential 
benefits, including the use of the local partner‟s marketing and distribution network and the 
ability to offer after-sales services.  An EJV can also benefit from any government 
connections the local partner may have.”  Our model reflects the advantages of marketing 
through a local partner by positing that the Chinese partner acts as marketing representative 
for the firm in the local market, a modeling decision based on pre-WTO-accession  
 We assume that domestic sales revenue is given by 1 2(1 ),B e e   where 1e is effort 
exerted by the foreign partner adapting technology to the local market and 2e is effort 
exerted by either party adapting production to the foreign designs or specifications. These 
efforts may be seen as raising quality and hence produce price.  We restrict  
                                                          
91 Greaney and Li (2009) provide sales shares for both U.S. and Japanese majority-owned non-bank affiliates. 
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                      . Production costs for achieving the foreign quality 
level are also influenced by production managers‟ effort and are given by 2(1 ).A e   
Marketing is done by the Chinese partner and marketing costs are reduced when the local 
partner exerts effort, 3e ,  to use its local connections: 3(1 )MP e .  These connections can be 
particularly valuable for foreign firms seeking domestic contracts, as noted repeatedly by the 
business partners and government officials interviewed by Wang (2001) and by Sutter (2000, 
p.15), who states “the absence of a Chinese partner able to make the right connections can 
make government relations works difficult.”  
Given these forms for revenues and costs, profits from the joint venture are given by  
 1 2 2 3(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 0,MB e e A e P e        (4.3.1.1) 
where additional sales raise profits so that 0MB A P   .  As in FH, we have introduced a 
link between sales revenue and production costs, with the production manager‟s effort 
influencing both.  This joint production reflects the assumption that it is difficult to fully 
compensate the production partner for his contribution to profits. 
 Period 1 effort investments impose a cost on those who make them.  Let (0,1)C   
indicate whether the foreign partner, 0,C   or the Chinese partner controls production.  
Retaining the simple functional forms used by FH, the cost of supplying effort to the foreign 
partner is 
2 2
1 2 1 2[ ,(1 ) ] ( / 2)( (1 ) ),f C f CC e e e e      while the cost of supplying effort to 
the Chinese partner is 2 22 3 2 3[ , ] ( / 2)( )s C s CC e e e e    .  The parameter, j , captures the 
disutility of effort to party j.  Given the extra costs associated with managing international 
activities, we assume 0f s   . 
 Total surplus from the project is profits net of investment costs: 
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1 2 2 3[ ,(1 ) ] [ , ],f C s CW C e e C e e       (4.3.1.2) 
 where  is given by (4.3.1.1).  Optimal effort levels maximize total surplus.  If perfect 
contracts were possible, optimal effort levels would be 
*
1 / ;fe B 
*
2 ( ) / ;se A B   and 
*
3 /M se P  .  Optimal assignment of production control to the Chinese partner results from 
our assumption that the disutility of effort is higher for the foreign partner than for the 
domestic partner. 
 Optimal efforts will not, in general, be made because contract imperfections lead the 
parties to Nash bargain over division of the surplus.  Effort levels depend on organizational 
form, which defines residual property rights, and the outside options available to each 
partner in the event that bargaining breaks down.  Letting 0 (0,1)  indicate ownership, 
with 0 0  signifying foreign ownership and 0 1  signifying Chinese ownership, imperfect 
contracts imply that total surplus depends on organizational form, 0( , )CW   .  We turn now 
to define each partner‟s outside options and the marginal investment incentives for effort 
under each ownership and control arrangement. 
 
4.3.2. Marginal Investment Incentives 
To solve for the individually optimal effort levels under each organizational form, we 
need to specify threat-point payoffs.  We make three assumptions, closely following Feenstra 
and Hanson (2005).  The first two assumptions are standard in the property-rights approach, 
although we adapt them to the Chinese context.  The third assumption is drawn from the 
FH approach and it captures the effort incentive for the Chinese partner provided by control 
of production.  We also add a fourth assumption that results in the elimination from one 
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organization form, a Chinese-owned firm in which production is controlled by a foreign 
manager.  This asymmetry reflects the fact that foreign firms operating in China have little or 
no incentive to exert effort in firms they do not own, unlike their Chinese partners. 
(A.1) When Nash bargaining breaks down, the party owning the factory is entitled to 
the residual profits that flow from completing the project using services purchased 
on the spot market.  If the foreign partner owns the factory, 0,O   it hires a 
domestic distribution agent to sell its output on the domestic market.  If the Chinese 
partner owns the factory,  1,O  it pays the foreign firm a licensing fee for use of its 
technology.  
(A.2) Under the spot contracts in (A.1) the parties earn only a fraction of their 
marginal products.  Specifically, we assume the payoffs are (1- ) times the first-best 
level.  As FH note,  may be interpreted as a measure of human-capital specificity of 
these investments or, alternatively, the ability to contract over them. We allow the 
degree of specificity to vary across the production tasks: IPR reflects the 
proportionate loss in return on technology adaptation effort if the foreign firm 
licenses it rather than uses it within firm boundaries, C is the proportionate loss in 
the return to production control effort, and M is the proportionate loss in return to 
marketing effort. 
(A.3) If the foreign partner owns the factory and Nash bargaining breaks down, the 
Chinese partner seeks a job elsewhere.  His prior investment in marketing is valued if 
and only if he has been in control of production.  This reflects the difference 
between being viewed by potential outside employers as a technical, rather than sales, 
representative for a foreign enterprise.  Production control also influences the threat 
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point payoff for the foreign firm.  Because technology transfer may occur outside his 
control, we assume that if bargaining breaks down, the foreign partner receives only 
a portion of the value of its technological adaptation effort, even if it owns the 
firm.92 
(A.4) If the Chinese partner owns the factory and Nash bargaining breaks down, the 
foreign partner is not rewarded for any effort, whether in adapting technology or 
controlling production.93  
These assumptions are similar to those in FH, except that we allow for the possibility 
of intellectual property violations if the technology is transferred outside the boundaries of 
the foreign firm.  We make the extreme assumption that this form of transfer can occur even 
if the foreign firm engages in a joint venture.   
 In bargaining over division of the surplus, the foreign firm has the primitive 
bargaining weight, , while the Chinese firm has bargaining weight, 1  .94  With threat 
point payoffs denoted , ,j j f s  , and total profits defined by (4.3.1.1), profits earned by 
each party are 
 
     ( ) (1 ) ,
     (1 )( ) .
f s f
s f s
Party f receives
Party s receives
     
    
   
   
 (4.3.2.1) 
                                                          
92 It is widely recognized that the Chinese government preferred joint ventures to wholly owned foreign 
enterprises because the EJV promised more transfer of technology and production know-how to the Chinese 
managers.  See Sutter (2000) for further discussion.   
93 A similar assumption is used by Antràs (2003), who assumes that investments by either party of a trade 
relationship are completely relationship-specific and that if the relationship breaks down, the value of the 
inputs outside the relationship is 0. 
94 Nash bargaining with fixed bargaining weights is maintained not only in Feenstra and Hanson (2005) but also 
in models with firm productivity heterogeneity, such as Antràs and Helpman (2004). 
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Each party chooses effort levels to maximize the difference between these payoffs and the 
costs of supplying efforts.  Using our assumptions about threat-point payoffs, marginal 
investment incentives can be derived for each organizational form.  If the foreign firm owns 
the factory, then (A.1) to (A.4) imply: 
 
1
1
2
2
/ ;  if 0
(1 ) / ;  if 1
( ) / ;  if 0
(1 )( ) / ;  if 1.
f
f C
f
IPR f C
f
f C
s
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e
A B
e
A B
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
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
 


  


  


   

 (4.3.2.2) 
As seen by (4.3.2.1), ownership provides less than full incentives for the foreign partner to 
adapt its technology to local market conditions since some share of its value is eroded by 
having exposed the Chinese partner to its proprietary technology.  Ownership, however, 
does provide full incentives to exert effort adapting production to its own technological 
specifications.  The Chinese partner, however, if given production control, earns a fraction 
of the marginal product of his efforts on the spot market and, thus, has less than full 
incentives to adapt local production to the foreign technology. 
 When the foreign partner has residual property rights, the Chinese partner has an 
incentive to use his connections to lower per unit marketing costs if and only if he controls 
production.  This implies that when the foreign firm owns the factory, marginal incentives 
for marketing effort by the Chinese firm are: 
 
3
[(1 ) ] / .s C M M sP
e

  

 

 (4.3.2.3) 
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Because the Chinese partner will not be rewarded for marketing effort should bargaining 
break down, he will not exert any if he does not also control production. 
 If the Chinese partner owns the project and has residual property rights (A.1) to 
(A.4) imply: 
 
3
2
2
/ ;  
0;  if 0
( (1 ) ) / ;  if 1.
s
M s
f
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s
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 (4.3.2.4) 
With ownership, the Chinese partner has full marginal incentives in marketing.  However, if 
bargaining breaks down, customers will consider the Chinese partner‟s efforts to raise quality 
through production effort as less successful since in that case the technology is only licensed.  
Therefore, he earns his full marginal product of effort reducing production costs (A), but 
less than full marginal product raising sales revenue ( B ).  As defined by (A.4), if given 
production control the foreign partner has no incentive to exert effort since effort adds 
nothing to his outside option.  Combined with the assumption that ,f s  this behavior 
implies that it will never be optimal for the parties to choose Chinese ownership with foreign 
production control as the venture‟s organizational form.   
 With Chinese ownership, the foreign firm receives no payment for effort if 
bargaining breaks down, as defined by (A.4).  Therefore, 
 
1
0.
f
e



 (4.3.2.5) 
Imperfect contracting over technology leads the foreign firm to have less than full marginal 
incentives to adapt its technology for the Chinese market. 
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 Effort levels can be found under each organizational form using the marginal 
investment incentives (4.3.2.2) to (4.3.2.5).  Inspection of the effort levels in Table 4.1 
indicates that Chinese ownership with foreign production control arrangement is dominated 
by Chinese ownership and control.  Efforts devoted to technology adaptation and marketing 
are the same across the two regimes, but production effort is lower with the split 
arrangement.  As a result, profits under Chinese ownership and production control are at 
least as high as they are under split ownership and control.  Consequently, we would not 
expect to observe the organizational form Chinese ownership-with-foreign control in the 
data. 
In other organizational arrangements, ownership leads to full marginal incentives for 
effort by the partner with residual property rights, the exception being foreign ownership but 
Chinese production control.  In this case, the foreign firm devotes less than first-best effort 
to adapting its technology because if bargaining breaks down, some of its efforts will be lost 
through “leakage” of its proprietary technology to the Chinese partner.  This joint venture 
arrangement, however, induces the Chinese partner to exert greater effort in marketing 
because production control ameliorates the holdup problem when the foreign firm owns the 
project.  Thus, for some projects a joint venture will be preferred by both partners. 
 
4.3.3. Comparison of Alternative Organizational Forms 
We use the individually optimal effort levels given in Table 4.1 to compute and 
compare the total surplus ( , )O CW   generated by each ownership and control arrangement.  
Because our empirical approach is based upon a sample of established equity joint ventures, 
we compare the surplus generated by a wholly foreign owned (WFOE) or wholly domestic 
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owned (DOM) enterprise to that generated by a joint venture with foreign ownership and 
Chinese production control (SFJV).  As in FH, these comparisons have a linear form and 
can be expressed as:  
 
2 2 2
1 1 1
2 2 2
2 2 2
WFOE v. SFJV:  (0,0) (0,1) ( ) ;
DOM v. SFJV:  (1,1) (0,1) ( ) .
M
M
W W a B c A B d P
W W a B c A B d P


    
    
 (4.3.3.1) 
Project surplus comparisons depend on three characteristics of the firm.  Recalling the first-
best effort levels, we may interpret 2B as the income generated by technological adaptation, 
2( )A B as the value added in production, and 2
M
P as the income generated by domestic 
marketing effort, when each is evaluated at the first best.95   
Using the effort levels in Table 4.1 to compute and compare project surplus, we can 
determine the signs of the coefficients in (4.3.3.1).  Comparing a WFOE to a SFJV, 
concentrating ownership and control in the foreign partner leads to greater effort in both 
technology and production adaptation, while providing less incentive for the Chinese firm to 
market the final product to domestic customers.  Therefore, for comparison of a WFOE to 
a SFJV, 1 1 10; 0; 0.a c d    
Comparing a DOM to a SFJV, concentrating ownership and 
control in the Chinese partner leads to greater effort in both marketing and production, 
while providing less incentive for the foreign firm to adapt its technology to Chinese 
production conditions.  Therefore, for comparison of a domestic owned enterprise to a 
SFJV, 2 2 20; 0; 0a c d   .  
 
                                                          
95 See Feenstra and Hanson (2005, p. 749) for a thorough discussion of these interpretations in the context of 
their model. 
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4.4. Empirical Strategy 
  Our empirical strategy is based on the liberalizations that occurred with Chinese 
accession to the WTO, which allowed equity joint venture partners greater latitude in 
choosing the organizational form that provides the highest surplus value.  As discussed in 
section II, foreign investors were constrained in their mode of entry into China prior to 
2000, but that substantial changes in law and policy associated with China‟s WTO accession 
significantly eased investors‟ ability to shape the form of their investments.  Our 
presumption is that the determinants of surplus value identified by our theoretical model will 
predict which enterprises shift from a joint venture to a wholly owned enterprise.  For 
example, firms using advanced technology may find that, once relieved of the export 
requirements that had been imposed on WFOEs, project surplus is higher if they operate as 
a wholly owned subsidiary and invest more in technology than was optimal when they 
operated as a joint venture.  Similarly, projects in which a significant share of value is added 
domestically on the shop floor may find that project surplus is higher if they operate as a 
domestic Chinese enterprise and bring their production effort closer to first-best.   
 
4.4.1. Econometric Specification 
  Our sample consists of all Sino-foreign equity joint venture projects established 
between 1992 and 2000, operating “above scale” and, therefore, included in the Annual 
Survey of Industrial Firms, and surviving as an ongoing industrial enterprise until 2006.96  We 
observe transitions from the initial joint-venture arrangement into one of three forms: 
                                                          
96 Anecdotal evidence and interviews with joint venture managers suggest that few projects switched from a 
SFJV to a wholly owned enterprise prior to 2000.  Exact numbers are not available; a firm-level panel can only 
be constructed from 1998 onward. 
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continuing as an equity joint venture (SFJV), transitioning to a wholly owned foreign 
enterprise (WFOE), or transitioning to a domestic enterprise without foreign equity 
participation (DOM).  We use our theoretical model to predict which firms, conditional on 
characteristics observed by 2000, will change status from an equity joint venture into one of 
the two wholly owned forms. 
  EJV partners choose the organizational form that maximizes the surplus value, 
which we do not observe directly, but instead treat as a latent variable, *
iW .  Our model 
provides an expression for the unobserved latent variable, * ,i i iW X    where X is a 
vector of enterprise characteristics, i is a coefficient vector associated with organization 
form i, and i is a random error term.  We observe ,iW where 
 
 
 
* * * *  1,  max , ,
0,                                 
i SFJV WFOE DOM
i
W W W W
W
otherwise
     

 (4.4.1.1) 
We assume errors are distributed i.i.d. and have an extreme value distribution.97  The 
probability of choosing organization form i is given by 
 
3
2
1
exp( ) / ,   1,2  and  1/
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 
 (4.4.1.2) 
We use the multinomial logit (MNL) model to estimate the coefficient vectors ,i allowing 
the SFJV form to be the reference choice.  Consequently, coefficients for this choice are set 
equal to zero.  Equations (4.3.3.1) provide expressions for the difference in surplus value for 
                                                          
97 The cumulative distribution function is given by ( ) exp( )
k
i
F w k e

    
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the two wholly owned forms versus a joint venture.  This expression guides our choice of 
regressors, which we construct to measure the value to the firm of technological effort, 
production effort, and marketing effort.  As frequently noted, the empirical tractability of the 
MNL model is obtained at the expense of strong maintained assumptions, particularly the 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA).  Although restrictive, tests proposed by 
Hausman and McFadden (1980) indicate that IIA is appropriate for our application.98 
 
4.4.2. Data  
Data used in this study are drawn from the Annual Surveys of Industrial Production 
conducted by the Chinese government‟s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The Annual 
Surveys of Industrial Production includes all non-state owned firms whose annual sales 
exceed 5 million yuan (referred to as “above-scale” industrial firms) and all state-owned 
enterprises.99, 100 The dataset contains detailed information on the firm and its operations, 
including geographic administrative code, ownership type, gross industrial output value, 
value added, export value, total employment, capital stock, and intermediate inputs.  In 
addition to ownership and location information, we make extensive use of the industry 
identifiers in the dataset.  The ASIF classifies enterprises using the four-digit Chinese 
Industrial Classification (CIC) system. CIC codes were readjusted and renumbered in 
                                                          
98 Using the Hausman and McFadden (1980) test, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that IIA holds at greater 
than the 96% significance level. 
99The NBS classifies non state-owned enterprises to include collectively-owned enterprises, Chinese indigenous 
privately-owned enterprises, and foreign-owned enterprises operating in China. The industry section of China 
Statistical Yearbook is compiled based on this dataset. Basic information of each four-digit industry in the 
China Markets Yearbook is also based on this dataset. 
100 This amounts to approximately $US 600,000 over this period.  
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2003.101 Consequently, we recode observations in years prior to 2003 thereby ensuring that 
industry codes are comparable across the sample period. 
Sino-foreign joint ventures are identified by the registration codes assigned to the 
firm.102 The final dataset includes 12,443 Sino-foreign joint ventures in 2000 that were 
established between 1992 and 2000, and which we use to create our balanced panel. Figure 
4.2 shows that by 2006, 79.6% of these joint ventures remain as SFJVs; 13.6% become 
wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOE) while 6.7% become wholly domestic-owned 
enterprises (DOM).103  
The property rights theory suggests that transitions from one organizational form to 
another can be explained by three characteristics of the joint venture: the value added by 
technology adaptation effort (B), value added by production effort ( ),A B and value 
added by domestic marketing effort ( )MP .  Allowing for heterogeneity among enterprises, we 
treat each of these values as firm specific and use firm-level data to create measures of them.  
All firm-level characteristics are measured as of 2000, prior to their transitions from one 
form to another.  All variables are defined and descriptive statistics displayed in Table 4.2. 
To capture the value added by technology adaptation effort, we create a measure of 
how technologically advanced the joint venture is relative to domestic firms operating in the 
                                                          
101 Prior to 2003, NBS followed GB/T 4754 - 1994 industry classification system and 2003 onwards GB/T 
4754 - 2002 was adopted. Two changes were made in the 2 digit divisions: (i) the 1994 division 39 (“Arms and 
Ammunition Manufacturing”) was added to 2002 division 36 (“Special Equipment Manufacturing”). Then the 
remaining 2002 division codes were renumbered accordingly i.e. 1994 division 40 corresponds to 2002 division 
39, 1994 division 41 corresponds to 2002 division 40, 1994 division 42 corresponds to 2002 division 41, and 
1994 division 43 corresponds to 2002 division 42 (ii) 2002 division 43 (“Waste Resources and Old Material 
Recycling and Processing”) was added which was not part of manufacturing in the previous period. 
102 Registration codes 210, 220, 310, and 320 are categorized as SFJVs. 
103 If a firm transitions into multiple states throughout the sample period, only the first transition state is 
considered.  Multiple transitions are very rare in the data. 
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same industry.  The presumption inherent in this choice is that effort by the foreign partner 
is more valuable the more advanced the technology used by the Chinese factory relative to 
that used by domestic competitors.  This regressor, which we call “distance from domestic 
technology frontier” is calculated as the difference between a firm‟s own TFP (measured in logs) 
and the maximum TFP of the domestic Chinese firm within its two-digit industry in 2000.   
We calculate TFP for each enterprise using the Olley-Pakes (1996) methodology.104  
We measure value added by production effort using firm value added, while adding the 
level of employment at the enterprise as an additional control for enterprise size.  The ASIF 
provides information on nominal value added and we converted this to real value added 
using the Brandt-Rawski two digit industry output deflators (Brandt, Biesebroeck, Zhang, 
2005).105  
The third effort measure, domestic sales share, reflects the value of the Chinese partner 
efforts creating domestic sales.  To capture this at the firm level, we use the firm‟s local 
(Chinese) sales as a share of total sales. Perhaps surprisingly, even within industries 
enterprises have widely varying degrees of success in selling locally. 
We push our model and data further by testing for differences in the probability of 
switching organizational form in ways suggested by the property rights theory and Chinese 
laws and policies.  First, because the propensity for Chinese officials to approve the creation 
of a WFOE varies by industry and by province, we estimate the MNL adding industry and 
province fixed effects.  Secondly, we introduce interactions between our three main 
                                                          
104 Carried out using the Stata module opreg (Yasar, Raciborski, Poi, 2008).  Appendix 3A provides details on 
our use of the Olley-Pakes (1996) methodology and estimates of capital and labor coefficients at the two-digit 
CIC.   
105 The deflators are available at http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/public/N07057/CHINA/appendix/. 
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regressors and variables that capture regional or industrial variation in the outside options 
available to SFJV partners.   
Our first interaction term is an interaction between our technology measure, distance 
from the domestic frontier, and a dummy variable indicating whether or not the Chinese 
partner has a central government or provincial government affiliation.  Our hypothesis is 
that foreign partners in joint ventures with powerful government affiliation will be better 
compensated for any technological adaptations they make, should bargaining with their local 
partner break down.  While certainly the foreign partner may have lower bargaining power if 
the Chinese partner has powerful connections, these connections also may raise the profits 
that flow from Chinese operations by blocking direct competition from domestic private 
firms, other foreign competitors, or other state firms.  Indeed, some of the most successful 
joint ventures in China have powerful local partners.  For example, one of the most 
successful overseas-funded industrial enterprises in China is Shanghai Volkswagen Co, Ltd., 
a joint venture between Volkswagen and the Shanghai government. 
Our second interaction is an interaction between firm-level value added and a 
measure of the production manager‟s outside employment options.  Our hypothesis is that 
in locations where managers have many options within the same industry, they will be willing 
to exert more effort within the relationship as they will be better compensated should 
bargaining break down.  Our measure of the manager’s outside option is the share of all firms in 
the manager‟s city that are in the same four-digit industry.  Creation of this variable requires 
use of the full ASIF database as well as geo-coding of all enterprises in the database.  The 
dataset provides six digit county codes where the first two digits represent the province, the 
second two the city, and finally the last two digits designate the county.  
 92 
 
Our third interaction is an interaction between our measure of the value added by 
domestic marketing effort, share of domestic sales, and a measure of growth in the state 
share of sales in that four-digit industry between 1998 and 2000.  Our hypothesis is that 
marketing effort will be more important in industries where the state is expanding operations 
rather than retreating. 
 
4.5. Multinomial Logit Results 
4.5.1. Testing the Property Rights Model  
 Regression coefficients and their standard errors from the MNL model are displayed 
in Table 4.3.  Because SFJV is the reference form, the estimated coefficients reflect the effect 
of iX  on the likelihood of switching to organization form i relative to remaining as a joint 
venture.  We begin by including in the MNL estimation only the three enterprise 
characteristics suggested by the property rights model.  We add industry and then industry 
and province fixed effects, each in turn.  We calculate both the Schwarz and the Aikake 
criterion for model selection, and find that the former favors the model without industry and 
province controls while the latter points to the model with both sets of fixed effects.  
Because both models lead to similar conclusions regarding tests of the property rights 
theory, we have no reason to favor one over the other. 
Model (1) in Table 4.3 does not include industry or province controls.  Looking at 
this first model, we see that the data strongly support the theoretical predictions, with one 
exception.  Considering first the level of technology used by the enterprise, as measured by 
the distance between the venture‟s own TFP and the maximum of similar domestic 
operations, we find that relatively technologically advanced firms are significantly more likely 
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to become wholly foreign owned and significantly less likely to become wholly domestic 
owed than they are to remain joint ventures.  This result is consistent with the hypothesis 
that foreign managers exert more effort transferring technology to their Chinese subsidiaries 
when they own the entire operation.   
 Moving down the column, we see that firms with larger value added, controlling for 
enterprise employment, are significantly more likely to become wholly foreign owned and 
less likely to become wholly domestic owned than they are to remain joint ventures.  Again, 
this finding is consistent with the property rights theory, which predicts that managers will 
exert more effort when they also own the firm.  We note that the theory predicted no 
difference between the managerial effort exerted in a SFJV and a wholly domestic enterprise 
and, in the absence of industry and province controls, we find the coefficient on log value 
added is insignificant in explaining the propensity of firms to become wholly domestically 
owned.  We also note that the size of the firm, as measured by enterprise employment, is 
significant only for the transition to wholly domestic ownership: joint ventures that employ 
more workers are more likely to be acquired by their domestic partner than are smaller 
ventures.  Employment size seems to play no role in the transition to wholly foreign owned. 
 Continuing with the next regressor in Table 4.3, domestic sales share, again we find 
the results consistent with the theoretical predictions.  A large domestic sales share makes it 
significantly less likely that the SFJV will switch to a WFOE while a large domestic sales 
share makes it significantly more likely that the SFJV will become a wholly domestic firm.  
This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the Chinese partner is more willing to 
cultivate and use its domestic connections to gain domestic customers when it is assured 
residual rights to profits from these sales. 
 94 
 
 In model (2) we introduce two-digit industry controls.  As mentioned above, because 
regulations and policies guiding the approval of foreign acquisitions varies by industry, the 
associations we have uncovered between transition probabilities and firm characteristics 
could be entirely industry specific.  Importantly, the coefficients estimated with these 
controls for the three firm-level characteristics vary very little from those estimated without 
them.  Indeed, some coefficients become more significant.  The only unexpected result is 
that the negative coefficient estimated for log value added in the likelihood of switching to 
DOM becomes highly significant.  As noted above, the theory suggests that this coefficient 
should be insignificantly different from zero and the fact that it is negative and highly 
significant poses an interesting puzzle.  Strictly interpreted, the result suggests that Chinese 
managers are willing to exert less effort when the enterprise is fully domestically owned than 
when it is foreign owned.  While outside the scope of this study, this finding suggests that 
there may be important differences in human resource management by foreign and domestic 
owners and that these differences influence the effort levels of managers.106 
 In model (3) we introduce both industry and province controls.  Because only the 
largest projects require central government approval, provincial government policies may 
significantly influence the ability of firms to switch ownership forms.  The introduction of 
provincial controls reduces the magnitude of our estimated coefficients somewhat, but no 
signs or significance levels are affected.  Therefore, the general consistency of our MNL 
results with our theoretical predictions is maintained, even when we include both industry 
and province fixed effects. 
                                                          
106 Yan and Warner (2002) discuss indigenous management practices, especially human resource management, 
and their relevance to the choice of organizational form for multinational firms. 
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 Table 4.4 provides estimated elasticities and associated standard errors for the 
regression explanatory variables in Table 4.3, with respect to the probability share for each 
organization form.  Looking at model (3), which includes both provincial and industry fixed 
effects, we find that changes in value added lead to the largest changes in the probability of 
switching from a SFJV.  A one percentage change in value added, controlling for 
employment, reduces the probability of switching from a joint venture to a domestic firm by 
0.93 percent while increasing the probability of becoming a WFOE by 0.67 percent.  Raising 
productivity, relative to domestic firms in the same four-digit industry, by one percent 
boosts the likelihood of switching from a joint venture to a WFOE by 0.19 percent while 
decreasing the likelihood of the domestic partner buying out the foreign investor by 0.35 
percent.  A percent increase in the share of sales sold locally works in the opposite direction, 
however, raising the probability of switching to a wholly domestic firm by 0.56 percent while 
reducing the probability of becoming a wholly foreign owned enterprise by 0.25 percent. 
 
4.5.2. Allowing for Differences across Firms and Markets 
 We use interaction terms to test whether differences in partner affiliation, local 
industrial concentration, and state ownership influence the decision to switch organizational 
forms.  Table 4.5 provides the MNL estimates for this model, which interacts the three main 
regressors drawn from property rights theory with variables that attempt to capture aspects 
of each partner‟s outside options.   
In model (1), we see that an interaction of technological distance with partner 
affiliation is negative and highly significant.  Indeed, when the affiliation dummy takes the 
value of unity, distance from the domestic technology frontier is associated with a lower 
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rather than higher probability of switching from a joint venture to a WFOE.  This result 
implies that foreign investors affiliated with central or provincial governments are less likely 
to buy out their domestic joint venture partner, controlling for enterprise productivity.  
Using the property rights theory as a lens, this suggests that powerful affiliation protects the 
property rights of foreign technology providers, perhaps by reducing local start-ups by 
former employees familiar with the technology.  Powerful affiliation also makes it less likely 
that the joint venture will become wholly domestic owned, conditional on productivity, again 
suggesting a strengthening of the outside option for the foreign partner within the 
relationship.  As seen in models (2) and (3) in Table 4.5, including industry fixed effects or 
industry and province fixed effects does not change these conclusions. 
We interact the enterprise‟s value added with a measure of the Chinese manager‟s 
outside option: the density of own-industry firms located in the same city as the joint 
venture.  Again using the property rights model as a lens, increases in own-industry density 
should make it easier for a manager to gain similar employment should Nash bargaining 
inside the joint venture break down.  Consequently, increases in own-industry density should 
reduce the influence of value added on transition probabilities because manager effort is 
easier to obtain inside the SFJV relationship.  Looking at model (1), we see that the estimates 
support this interpretation as the influence on value added on the transition probability is 
smaller for enterprises in cities with better outside options.  For transitions to wholly foreign 
owned, the estimated coefficient is -0.874 and it is highly significant.  When evaluated at the 
mean, enterprises with larger value added remain more likely to become WFOEs although 
this effect is smaller in cities with better outside options for managers.  Interestingly, in the 
transition from SFJV to DOM, the interaction of value added and manager‟s outside option 
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is insignificant at the 5% level across all specifications.  As in models estimated without 
interactions, higher value added makes it significantly more likely that the firm will remain a 
joint venture rather than become wholly domestic owned.  Again, the motivation of 
managers inside wholly domestic firms appears to be different than that suggested by the 
property rights model. 
Lastly, we include an interaction of the share of sales sold on domestic markets and 
the change in state share of industry sales. 107  The hypothesis is that in industries where state 
dominance is growing, having a Chinese partner is more important for a joint venture 
attempting to make local sales.  For the transition to WFOE, this interaction is positive but 
insignificant across all models.  For the transition to DOM, the interaction is significant 
when we add industry fixed effects or industry and province fixed effects.  We conclude that 
increasing in state dominance of the industry does not significantly influence the value of 
having a domestic partner for firms selling to local markets. 
 
4.6. Conclusions 
 Changes in policy and practice signaled by China‟s accession to the WTO offer a rare 
opportunity to observe how multinationals respond to changes in property rights in a 
developing country.  WTO accession reduced incentives for multinational firms to form 
joint ventures with Chinese enterprises while simultaneously reducing constraints placed on 
operation of wholly owned subsidiaries.  Changes in Chinese leadership also produced a 
more liberal investment environment for indigenous Chinese investors.  An adaptation of 
the property rights model developed by Feenstra and Hanson (2005) suggests that higher the 
                                                          
107 We also created a variable measuring the state share of downstream sales for the enterprise‟s industry, using 
the 2002 Chinese input-output table.  This variable was never significant, as an interaction term or a regressor. 
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productivity and value added of the joint venture, but lower its domestic sales share, the 
more likely the joint venture will be to transition to a wholly foreign owned subsidiary 
following liberalization of the choice of organization form.  The theory also suggests that 
enterprises with lower productivity but higher value added and domestic sales share will be 
more likely to be acquired by their Chinese partners, transitioning from joint ventures to 
wholly domestic firms. 
Using newly created enterprise-level panel data on equity joint ventures and changes 
in registration type following China‟s WTO accession, we find evidence consistent with the 
property rights theory of organization form.  Enterprises with higher productivity, measured 
by the distance of their estimated TFP from the maximum TFP of domestic firms in the 
same industry, are more likely to become WFOEs and less likely to become wholly domestic 
firms.  This finding indicates that the decision by the Chinese leadership to liberalize its 
stance toward wholly foreign owned firms may indeed promote greater transfer of 
technology to China, as is its intent.  While the foreign business community continues to 
question China‟s commitment to IPR protection, this finding does indicate that WTO 
accession created a regime change strong enough to alter incentives that guide the choice of 
multinationals‟ organizational form.108 
We also find that joint ventures having affiliations with central or provincial 
governments are less likely to become wholly owned by their foreign partners, given the 
                                                          
108 A recent and prominent criticism of China‟s stance toward IPR protection comes from Ian Bremmer, 
Chairman of the Eurasia Group, who voices the fears of Western multinationals when he states, “What China 
needs is technology, advanced technology, quite advanced technology.  But Western corporations, increasingly, 
aren‟t willing to provide that level of technology, especially given how bad intellectual property protection and 
regulation is in China” (McKinsey Quarterly, 2010, p.3). 
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extent of their productivity advantage over domestic competitors.  We have interpreted this 
result as an indication that powerful affiliations within China work to protect the intellectual 
property of the foreign partner and, thus, raise the effort they exert within the joint-venture 
and reduce the value of buying out of the relationship.  This finding is consistent with views 
powerfully expressed and carefully supported by Yasheng Huang (2008), who argues that 
state-affiliated firms maintain an advantage over unaffiliated domestic entrepreneurs.  It is 
possible that foreign firms, aided by state affiliation, are shielded from competition from 
indigenous start-ups.  There are many dimensions to this issue that warrant further research, 
with policy implications stretching beyond foreign technology transfer to the promotion of 
indigenous entrepreneurship. 
Our results also suggest that selling to local Chinese markets remains difficult for 
foreign firms without local connections.  Perhaps this is to be expected in a society in which 
the rule of law is new, discretion in the application of the law remains great, and property 
rights are evolving rapidly.  Nevertheless, the significant of domestic sales share as a 
predictor of which firms will choose to be wholly foreign or wholly domestic owned 
suggests that access to the Chinese market is certain to generate continuing WTO dispute 
settlement activity. 
Taken together, our findings affirm the relevance of property rights and incomplete 
contracts as a determinant of firm behavior within China.  While previous theory and 
empirics have focused on ownership and control over input search among export processing 
operations in China, we extend the literature to consider how evolving property rights alter 
decisions about ownership and control for enterprises serving, at least partially, the domestic 
Chinese market.  Our results suggest that changing incentives for technology, production, 
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and marketing effort provide a useful guide to organizational choices made by both Chinese 
and foreign investors.  They also indicate that improvements in contractibility influence 
firms in ways that depend on firm-level characteristics, a finding in keeping with the 
theoretical insights of Antràs and Helpman (2008), who also stress heterogeneity in firm 
response to improvement in property rights.  They also support the contention that external 
commitment to liberalization of foreign business operations through rigorous WTO 
accession procedures influences multinational and indigenous firms‟ behavior.   Embedded 
incentives for particular organizational forms, therefore, emerge as determinants of firms‟ 
response to evolving property rights. 
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Appendices 
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Appendix 2A: Balancing Tests, All Industries. 
 
  
Mean 
 
% 
Reduction t-test 
Variable Sample OECD HMT % Bias |Bias| t p > t 
TFP Unmatched 6.0541   5.8613 8.9 
 
2.55 0.011 
 
Matched 6.0603   6.0958 -1.6 81.6 -0.46 0.648 
       Sales Unmatched 10.184      10.00 8.8 
 
2.51 0.012 
 
Matched 10.184   10.232 -2.3 74.1 -0.65 0.515 
       Sales Squared Unmatched 108.31   104.18 12.9 
 
3.72 0.000 
 
Matched 108.31   108.02 0.9 92.8 0.26 0.798 
       Capital per Worker Unmatched 3.8455   3.6912 7.2 
 
2.06 0.040 
 
Matched 3.8446   3.8854 -0.0 99.5 -0.01 0.992 
       Wage per Worker Unmatched 2.2764   2.1825 8.7 
 
2.50 0.013 
 
Matched 2.2767   2.2897 -1.2 86.1 -0.33 0.741 
       Age Unmatched 1.5838   1.6173 -3.7 
 
-1.07 0.287 
 
Matched 1.5836   1.5591 2.7 26.8 0.75 0.451 
       Age2 Unmatched 3.3195    3.4195 -2.6 
 
-0.75 0.455 
 
Matched 3.3192   3.1948 3.3 -24.5 1.00 0.318 
       Export Intensity Unmatched .33588   .34647 -2.5 
 
-0.72 0.474 
 
Matched .33610   .33622 -0.0 98.9 -0.01 0.994 
       State Equity Share Unmatched .48352   .44528 8.4 
 
2.39 0.017 
  Matched .48058    .47684 0.8 90.2 0.231 0.821 
Notes: Export intensity measured as (value of exports/total sales); Total factor productivity (TFP) measured 
using Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) method; All variables, other than those expressed as shares, are in the log 
form. 
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Appendix 2B: Industry Ranking by Domestic Content.  
 
Two Digit 
CIC Industry Name DC 
13 Processing of Food from Agricultural Products 0.943 
15 Manufacture of Beverages 0.940 
36 Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery 0.925 
31 Manufacture of Non-metallic Mineral Products 0.920 
24  Manufacture of Articles For Culture, Education and Sport Activity 0.920 
42 Manufacture of Artwork and Other Manufacturing 0.908 
29 Manufacture of Rubber 0.871 
23 Printing, Reproduction of Recording Media 0.859 
17 Manufacture of Textile 0.857 
26 Manufacture of Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products 0.853 
28 Manufacture of Chemical Fibers 0.846 
41 
Manufacture of Measuring Instruments and Machinery for Cultural Activity 
and Office Work  0.838 
27 Manufacture of Medicines 0.828 
21 Manufacture of Furniture 0.824 
37 Manufacture of Transport Equipment 0.810 
33 Smelting and Pressing of Non-ferrous Metals 0.772 
14 Manufacture of Foods 0.749 
25 Processing of Petroleum, Coking, Processing of Nuclear Fuel 0.741 
19 Manufacture of Leather, Fur, Feather and Related Products 0.740 
22 Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products 0.732 
39 Manufacture of Electrical Machinery and Equipment 0.727 
32 Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals 0.725 
35 Manufacture of General Purpose Machinery 0.706 
20 
Processing of Timber, Manufacture of Wood, Bamboo, Rattan, Palm, and 
Straw Products 0.590 
40 
Manufacture of Communication Equipment, Computers and Other 
Electronic Equipment 0.585 
18 Manufacture of Textile Wearing Apparel, Footwear, and Caps 0.584 
34 Manufacture of Metal Products 0.455 
30 Manufacture of Plastics 0.240 
Source: Author‟s calculations.  
Notes: See section 5.5 for details on calculation of domestic content (DC).  
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Appendix 2C: Number of Acquired Firms, By Industry.  
 
Two Digit CIC OECD HMT 
13 96 69 
14 58 45 
15 35 21 
17 111 214 
18 147 202 
19 72 97 
20 31 33 
21 17 24 
22 26 51 
23 11 36 
24 43 45 
25 8 4 
26 90 107 
27 47 41 
28 6 5 
29 14 7 
30 63 122 
31 82 120 
32 23 21 
33 17 18 
34 70 94 
35 92 56 
36 30 26 
37 69 47 
39 78 100 
40 99 115 
41 15 29 
42 43 64 
Total 1,493 1,813 
Notes: The table reports number of acquired firms by two-
digit Chinese Industrial Classification (CIC). Industry 16 
“Tobacco Products and Processing” has been excluded. The 
numbers exclude firms that switch two-digit industry post-
acquisition. All firms are on the common support.  
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Appendix 2D: Multinomial Logit Model of Number of Foreign Acquisitions, Textile 
Industry Only.  
 
  OECD HMT 
TFP 0.058 -0.065** 
 (0.061) (0.031) 
Sales -0.132 -0.293*** 
 (0.217) (0.083) 
Sales Squared 0.017* 0.028*** 
 (0.010) (0.004) 
Capital per Worker 0.008 -0.068** 
 (0.045) (0.035) 
Wage per Worker 0.014 0.096 
 (0.083) (0.059) 
Age 0.049 0.059 
 (0.187) (0.299) 
Age2 -0.147*** -0.127 
 (0.054) (0.094) 
Export Intensity 0.606*** 0.391*** 
 (0.150) (0.121 
State Equity Share 1.217*** 1.125*** 
 (0.133) (0.118) 
Constant -7.273*** -5.077*** 
 (1.136) (0.459) 
Observations 116,074 
Log Likelihood -4,958.49 
Pseudo-R2 0.06 
Schwarz criterion 10,383.46 
Aikake criterion 9,996.98 
Notes: The base category are all firms not acquired by HMT or OECD 
investors; Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; Significant at * 
10% , ** 5%, *** 1% levels; Export intensity measured as (value of 
exports/total sales); All regressions include year, region, and two-digit 
industry dummies; All explanatory variables, other than dummies or 
those expressed as shares, enter in the log form. 
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Appendix 2E: Balancing Tests, Textile Industry Only.  
 
  
Mean   
% 
Reduction t-test 
Variable Sample OECD HMT % Bias |Bias| t p > t 
        TFP Unmatched 5.9005 5.6039 16.8 
 
2.06 0.040 
 
Matched 5.9005 6.9666 -3.8 77.7 -0.51 0.610 
        Real Sales Unmatched 10.111 9.9761 8.0 
 
0.98 0.326 
 
Matched 10.111 10.315 -12.0 -50.5 -1.70 0.090 
        Real Sales 
Squared Unmatched 104.49 103.00 5.9 
 
0.73 0.465 
 
Matched 104.49 107.84 -13.1 -123.7 -1.61 0.107 
        Capital per 
Worker Unmatched 3.2972 3.2926 0.20 
 
-0.03 0.977 
 
Matched 3.2972 3.5666 -14.3 -5,864.7 -1.87 0.062 
        Wage per 
Worker Unmatched 2.1570 2.0777 9.1 
 
1.16 0.245 
 
Matched 2.1570 2.1422 1.7 81.3 0.20 0.843 
        Age Unmatched 1.5824 1.6586 -8.0 
 
-1.01 0.314 
 
Matched 1.5824 1.5898 -0.4 94.7 -0.05 0.958 
        Age2 Unmatched 3.3008 3.5974 -7.9 
 
-0.95 0.344 
 
Matched 3.3008 3.1207 4.8 39.3 0.80 0.425 
        Export Intensity Unmatched 0.51027 0.4515 13.3 
 
1.68 0.094 
 
Matched 0.51027 0.4737 8.3 37.8 0.94 0.349 
        State Equity 
Share Unmatched 0.41822 0.39699 4.8 
 
0.60 0.550 
  Matched 0.41822 0.41383 1.0 79.3 0.11 0.913 
Notes: Export intensity measured as (value of exports/total sales); Total factor productivity (TFP) 
measured using Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) method; All variables, other than those expressed as shares, are 
in the log form; Textile industry is composed of two-digit CIC industries 17 (Manufacture of Textile) 
and 18 (Manufacture of Textile Wearing Apparel, Footwear, and Caps). 
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Appendix 3A: TFP Measure using Olley-Pakes (1996).  
 
The Olley and Pakes (1996) method corrects for two issues that arise when 
calculating productivity as the residual from an OLS regression. First, OLS estimate of the 
production function leads to biased coefficients on labor due to simultaneity bias. 
Simultaneity bias arises since the variable input choice of a firm is positively correlated with 
its productivity. Firms will increase employment if they experience positive productivity 
shocks and vice versa. Fixed effects could be used to address this problem if we are willing 
to assume that the productivity shocks do not vary over time.  
Second, sample selection bias arises when using OLS due to the exit of firms because 
of adverse productivity shocks. For example, if more productive firms are also more capital 
intensive, they will be able to better withstand periods of low or negative productivity shocks 
in anticipation of future profitability so that OLS estimation of the capital coefficient will be 
biased downwards. The Olley and Pakes methodology uses investment as a proxy for 
unobserved productivity to address these two issues and obtain consistent estimates of the 
labor and capital coefficients.  
 Input coefficients are calculated for each two digit industry under the Chinese 
Industrial Classification system. Then these coefficients are used to calculate the log TFP of 
each enterprise as: 
           ̂    ̂   
where value added and the input coefficients are in logs and  ̂   and  ̂  are estimated under 
the Olley and Pakes methodology. As expected, OLS produces larger estimates of the labor 
coefficients but smaller capital coefficients than the Olley and Pakes method. 
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Appendix 3B: Own and Cross Type Localization Spillovers. 
 
Dependent Variable: Log of Enterprise TFP (Olley-Pakes) 
 
 STATE OWNED  PRIVATE OWNED  FOREIGN OWNED 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Log Own Industry Employment       
(State-owned) 0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
(Private-owned) 0.031*** 
(0.003) 
0.032*** 
(0.004) 
0.025*** 
(0.001) 
0.026*** 
(0.007) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
(Foreign-owned) -0.001 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
Year, City, 4-Digit Industry 
Dummies 
Y - Y - Y - 
City*Year Dummies - Y - Y - Y 
4-Digit Industry Dummies - Y - Y - Y 
Adjusted R
2
  0.47 0.47 0.49 0.46 0.54 0.55 
# Enterprises 58,879 58,879 1,092,188 1,092,188 334,888 334,888 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the 4-Digit Industry level; ***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at 
the 5% level;*Significant at the 10% level; Industry 16 “Tobacco Products Processing” has been excluded. 
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Appendix 3C: Own and Cross Type Localization Spillovers, by Source of Foreign Investment. 
 
Dependent Variable: Log of Enterprise TFP (Olley-Pakes) 
 STATE OWNED  
 
PRIVATE OWNED ETHNICALLY 
CHINESE OWNED 
     NON-ETHNICALLY 
CHINESE OWNED 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Log Own Industry 
Employment 
        
(State-owned) 0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.014*** 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
(Private-owned) 0.031*** 
(0.003) 
0.032*** 
(0.004) 
0.024*** 
(0.001) 
0.026*** 
(0.007) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.012*** 
(0.002) 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
(Ethnically Chinese-owned) 0.005 
(0.05) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.013*** 
(0.002) 
0.013*** 
(0.005) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
(Non-ethnically Chinese-
owned) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
Year, City, 4-Digit Industry 
Dummies 
Y - Y - Y - Y - 
City*Year Dummies - Y - Y - Y - Y 
4-Digit Industry Dummies - Y - Y - Y - Y 
Adjusted R
2
  0.47 0.47 0.49 0.46 0.56 0.58 0.52 0.53 
# Enterprises 58,879 58,879 1,092,188 1,092,188 178,933 178,933 155,955 155,955 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the 4-Digit Industry level; ***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% 
level;*Significant at the 10% level; Industry 16 “Tobacco Products Processing” has been excluded. 
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________________________________________________________________________ 
Figures and Tables 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Figure 2.1: TFP Distribution of Acquired Firms in the Pre-Acquisition Period. 
 
Notes: TFP measured using the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) method.   
 
 
Figure 2.2:  Source Distribution of Foreign Projects, By Province, 1993 – 1996. 
 
 
 
Source: Dean, Lovely, Wang (2005). 
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Figure 3.1: Employment by Ownership Type, 1998-2006. 
 
Source: Author‟s calculations. 
Notes: SOE (state-owned enterprises), POE (private-owned enterprises), FOE (foreign-owned 
enterprises); ALL (all enterprises). 
 
Figure 4.1 (a): Contracted FDI Inflows to China by Registration Type, 1992 – 1999 (in 
100 million USD). 
 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistics Press), various years. 
Notes: “Others" include Foreign Investment Share Enterprises, Cooperative Development, and 
Others.  
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Figure 4.1 (b): Utilized FDI Inflows to China by Registration Type, 1997 – 2006 (in 
100 million USD). 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistics Press), various years. 
Notes: “Others" include Foreign Investment Share Enterprises, Cooperative Development, and 
Others. 
 
Figure 4.2: Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures by Initial Ownership and Transition State by 
2006. 
 
Notes: Sino-foreign joint venture (SFJV); Wholly foreign-owned (WFOE); Wholly domestic-owned 
(DOMESTIC).  
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Table 2.1:  Actually Utilized FDI from OECD Countries (%). 
 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
United States 16.51% 22.30% 22.41% 17.68% 18.20% 13.46% 10.25% 7.73% 7.15% 
Japan 14.40% 17.99% 17.38% 13.56% 11.41% 10.90% 14.18% 16.48% 11.48% 
Germany 3.12% 7.26% 5.32% 4.84% 3.11% 2.75% 2.75% 3.86% 4.94% 
United 
Kingdom 
4.97% 5.53% 5.95% 4.20% 3.01% 2.38% 2.06% 2.43% 1.81% 
France 3.03% 4.68% 4.36% 2.12% 1.93% 1.94% 1.71% 1.55% 0.96% 
Denmark 0.27% 0.45% 0.25% 0.22% 0.24% 0.14% 0.17% 0.25% 0.48% 
Switzerland 0.97% 1.31% 0.99% 0.82% 0.67% 0.58% 0.53% 0.52% 0.49% 
Canada 1.34% 1.66% 1.43% 1.76% 1.97% 1.81% 1.60% 1.15% 1.06% 
Australia 1.15% 1.39% 1.58% 1.34% 1.28% 1.90% 1.72% 1.01% 1.38% 
Austria 0.09% 0.12% 0.12% 0.23% 0.23% 0.30% 0.25% 0.19% 0.37% 
Belgium 0.12% 0.44% 0.29% 0.08% 0.42% 0.35% 0.21% 0.14% 0.20% 
Czech Republic 0.02% 0.07% 0.05% 0.02% 0.05% 0.04% 0.09% 0.01% 0.05% 
Finland 0.17% 0.36% 0.31% 0.29% 0.22% 0.10% 0.07% 0.05% 0.14% 
Greece 0.00% 0.00% 0.07% 0.03% 0.02% 0.01% 0.07% 0.00% 0.00% 
Hungary 0.05% 0.06% 0.05% 0.09% 0.07% 0.08% 0.13% 0.11% 0.08% 
Iceland 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 
Ireland 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 0.01% 0.04% 0.03% 0.01% 0.02% 0.06% 
Italy 1.16% 0.99% 1.07% 0.88% 0.59% 1.01% 0.73% 0.81% 0.87% 
Korea 7.63% 6.74% 7.61% 8.58% 9.13% 14.39% 16.25% 13.04% 9.73% 
Luxembourg 0.05% 0.02% 0.12% 0.11% 0.05% 0.56% 0.07% 0.36% 0.24% 
Mexico 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 0.02% 0.06% 0.02% 0.03% 
Netherlands 3.04% 2.87% 4.04% 3.10% 1.92% 2.33% 2.11% 2.63% 2.10% 
New Zealand 0.11% 0.10% 0.09% 0.19% 0.15% 0.21% 0.30% 0.33% 0.21% 
Norway 0.11% 0.10% 0.12% 0.02% 0.10% 0.06% 0.00% 0.07% 0.03% 
Poland 0.00% 0.02% 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% 0.02% 
Portugal 0.04% 0.04% 0.02% 0.10% 0.03% 0.01% 0.09% 0.01% 0.02% 
Slovak 
Republic 
0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.05% 0.00% 0.04% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 
Spain 0.23% 0.09% 0.17% 0.14% 0.31% 0.29% 0.39% 0.50% 0.59% 
Sweden 0.56% 0.82% 0.81% 0.34% 0.33% 0.39% 0.31% 0.28% 0.51% 
Turkey 0.00% 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.04% 0.02% 0.06% 0.03% 
Total OECD 
Share in non-
HMT Total 59.16% 75.47% 74.67% 60.84% 55.54% 56.11% 56.15% 53.65% 45.04% 
Source: Author‟s calculations, China Statistical Yearbook (various years).  
Note: The table reports the percentage share of actually utilized FDI in the non-HMT total.   
 
 
 113 
 
Table 2.2: Multinomial Logit Model of Foreign Acquisitions, All Industries. 
 
 
 
 
  
    OECD   HMT 
TFP  0.007 
 
-0.004 
  (0.017) 
 
(0.017) 
Sales  -0.321*** 
 
-.253*** 
  (0.039) 
 
(0.041) 
Sales Squared  0.028*** 
 
0.023*** 
  (0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
Capital per Worker  -0.018 
 
-0.035* 
  (0.018) 
 
(0.002) 
Wage per Worker  0.138*** 
 
0.061* 
  (0.028) 
 
(0.034) 
Age  0.169 
 
0.148 
  (0.129) 
 
(0.115) 
Age2  -0.204*** 
 
-0.182*** 
  (0.039) 
 
(0.037) 
Export Intensity  0.789*** 
 
0.749*** 
  (0.071) 
 
(0.063) 
State Equity Share  1.123*** 
 
1.097*** 
  (0.075) 
 
(0.067) 
Constant  -6.310*** 
 
-6.224*** 
  (0.257) 
 
(0.246) 
Observations   942,771 
Log Likelihood  -26,493.76 
Pseudo-R2  0.08 
Schwarz criterion  53,661.59 
Aikake criterion   53,085.52 
Notes: The base category are all firms not acquired by HMT or OECD investors; 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; Significant at * 10% , ** 5%, *** 1% 
levels; Export intensity measured as (value of exports/total sales); All regressions 
include year, region, and two-digit industry dummies; All explanatory variables, 
other than dummies or those expressed as shares, enter in the log form. 
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Table 2.3: Matching Difference-in-Differences Results for Productivity. 
 
Log (TFP) 
    
Year ( ) 
Matching 
Estimate† 
Bootstrapped 
Std. Error Z-Stat Matched Pairs 
Year of Acquisition 0.123* 0.064 1.922 1,493 
One Year After 0.111* 0.062 1.780 1,493 
Two Years After 0.245** 0.083 2.947 1,493 
     
Log (Labor Productivity) 
Year ( ) 
Matching 
Estimate† 
Bootstrapped 
Std. Error Z-Stat Matched Pairs 
Year of Acquisition 0.177** 0.083 2.130 1,493 
One Year After 0.153** 0.069 2.219 1,493 
Two Years After 0.224** 0.086 2.592 1,493 
Notes: †
 
 
∑ ,(  
       
    )  (  
      
   )-      where   is the pre-acquisition year; 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis using 100 repetitions; *, **, ** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 2.4: Matching Difference-in-Differences Results, HMT-dense provinces. 
 
Log (Profits) 
    
Year ( ) 
Matching 
Estimate† 
Bootstrapped 
Std. Error Z-Stat Matched Pairs 
Year of Acquisition -0.056 0.254 0.221 350 
One Year After 0.253 0.261 0.969 350 
Two Years After 0.741** 0.320 2.316 350 
     
Log (TFP) 
Year ( ) 
Matching 
Estimate† 
Bootstrapped 
Std. Error Z-Stat Matched Pairs 
Year of Acquisition -0.008 0.175 0.046 350 
One Year After 0.061 0.135 0.452 350 
Two Years After 0.142 0.190 0.747 350 
Notes: †
 
 
∑ ,(  
       
    )  (  
      
   )-      where   is the pre-acquisition year; 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis using 100 repetitions; *, **, ** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. Total factor productivity (TFP) measured 
using Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) method. 
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Table 2.5: Matching Difference-in-Differences Results for Productivity, by Target 
Ownership Type. 
 
Private-owned firms 
   
Year ( ) 
Matching 
Estimate† 
Bootstrapped 
Std. Error Z-Stat Matched Pairs 
Year of Acquisition 0.129 0.128 1.008 711 
One Year After 0.132 0.106 1.245 711 
Two Years After 0.199* 0.129 1.543 711 
 
    
State-owned firms 
Year ( ) 
Matching 
Estimate† 
Bootstrapped 
Std. Error Z-Stat Matched Pairs 
Year of Acquisition 0.117 0.092 1.272 782 
One Year After 0.093 0.093 1.000 782 
Two Years After 0.287* 0.102 2.814 782 
Notes: †
 
 
∑ ,(  
       
    )  (  
      
   )-      where   is the pre-acquisition year; 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis using 100 repetitions; *, **, ** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. Log total factor productivity (TFP) 
measured using Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) method. 
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Table 2.6: Matching Difference-in-Differences Results for non-TFP Outcomes. 
  
(a) Log (Profits) 
Year ( ) 
Matching 
Estimate† 
Bootstrapped 
Std. Error Z-Stat Matched Pairs 
Year of Acquisition 0.266** 0.113 2.354 1,493 
One Year After 0.353** 0.125 2.817 1,493 
Two Years After 0.523*** 0.136 3.833 1,493 
     (b) Log (Average Wage) 
Year of Acquisition 0.143*** 0.039 3.717 1,493 
One Year After 0.117*** 0.041 2.818 1,493 
Two Years After 0.128*** 0.041 3.111 1,493 
     (c) Log (Employment) 
Year of Acquisition 0.018 0.039 0.479 1,493 
One Year After 0.037 0.039 0.962 1,493 
Two Years After 0.084* 0.048 1.763 1,493 
     (d) Log (Capital per Worker) 
Year of Acquisition 0.215*** 0.062 3.477 1,493 
One Year After 0.259*** 0.068 3.782 1,493 
Two Years After 0.214*** 0.065 3.280 1,493 
     (e) Export Intensity 
Year of Acquisition 0.005 0.011 0.436 1,493 
One Year After 0.007 0.012 0.524 1,493 
Two Years After 0.005 0.012 0.386 1,493 
     (f) Innovation Intensity 
Year of Acquisition 0.008 0.008 0.994 720 
One Year After 0.004 0.008 0.574 1,109 
Two Years After 0.001 0.008 0.067 1,192 
Notes: †
 
 
∑ ,(  
       
    )  (  
      
   )-      where   is the pre-acquisition year; 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis using 100 repetitions; *, **, ** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. Export intensity measured as (value of 
exports/total sales); Innovation intensity measured as (new product output value/total sales). 
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Table 2.7: Matching Difference-in-Differences Results for Productivity, By Industry 
Grouping.  
 
(a) High Domestic Content Industries 
Year ( ) 
Matching 
Estimate† 
Bootstrapped 
Std. Error Z-Stat Matched Pairs 
Year of Acquisition 0.186* 0.089 2.113 726 
One Year After 0.127 0.089 1.427 726 
Two Years After 0.254** 0.119 2.136 726 
 
 
(b) Low Domestic Content Industries 
Year ( ) 
Matching 
Estimate† 
Bootstrapped 
Std. Error Z-Stat Matched Pairs 
Year of Acquisition 0.063 0.121 0.515 767 
One Year After 0.097 0.100 0.975 767 
Two Years After 0.236* 0.142 1.657 767 
Notes: †
 
 
∑ ,(  
       
    )  (  
      
   )-      where   is the pre-acquisition year; 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis using 100 repetitions; *, **, ** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. Log total factor productivity (TFP) 
measured using Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) method. 
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Table 2.8: Matching Difference-in-Differences Results for Productivity, Textile 
Industry Only. 
 
Log (TFP) 
    
Year ( ) 
Matching 
Estimate† 
Bootstrapped Std. 
Error Z-Stat Matched Pairs 
Year of Acquisition 0.181* 0.099 1.814 258 
One Year After 0.137 0.129 1.062 258 
Two Years After 0.150 0.103 0.103 258 
     
Log (Labor Productivity) 
Year ( ) 
Matching 
Estimate† 
Bootstrapped Std. 
Error Z-Stat Matched Pairs 
Year of Acquisition 0.197* 0.121 1.630 258 
One Year After 0.070 0.134 0.526 258 
Two Years After 0.068 0.120 0.568 258 
Notes: †
 
 
∑ ,(  
       
    )  (  
      
   )-      where   is the pre-acquisition year; 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis using 100 repetitions; *, **, ** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively; Total factor productivity (TFP) measured using 
Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) method; Labor productivity measured as value added per worker; Textile 
industry is composed of two-digit CIC industries 17 (Manufacture of Textile) and 18 (Manufacture 
of Textile Wearing Apparel, Footwear, and Caps). 
 
Table 3.1: Interactions Between Ownership Types. 
 
                                           Enterprise Ownership Type 
Own-Industry Activity In: State Owned Private Owned Foreign Owned 
State Owned + ? ? 
Private Owned +/- + ? 
Foreign Owned +/- +/- + 
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Table 3.2: Distribution of Enterprises by Number of Plants (percentage), 1998-2006. 
 
Year Single-Plant Firms Firms with 2 Plants Firms with 3 or more Plants 
1998 96.69 1.43 1.88 
1999 95.58 1.40 3.02 
2000 97.09 1.15 1.76 
2001 95.35 1.89 2.76 
2002 94.97 2.30 2.73 
2003 96.76 1.49 1.75 
2004 95.60 2.42 1.98 
2005 97.00 1.57 1.43 
2006 97.40 1.38 1.22 
Source: Author‟s calculations. 
Notes: Enterprises with missing information on number of plants have been excluded. 
 
Table 3.3: Percentage Share of Employment Represented by Single-Plant Enterprises 
Within Each Ownership Type, 1998-2006. 
 
Year SOE POE ECE non-ECE 
1998 79 94 
 
99 
 
99 
 
1999 75 
 
94 
 
98 
 
98 
 
2000 77 
 
95 
 
99 
 
98 
 
2001 64 
 
89 
 
97 
 
95 
 
2002 65 
 
90 
 
96 
 
94 
 
2003 76 
 
95 
 
98 
 
98 
 
2004 67 
 
92 
 
96 
 
93 
 
2005 72 
 
94 
 
97 
 
96 
 
2006 73 
 
95 
 
97 
 
94 
 
Source: Author‟s calculations. 
Notes: Enterprises with missing information on number of plants have been excluded; 
SOE (state-owned enterprises), POE (private-owned enterprises), ECE (enterprises 
from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan), non-ECE (enterprises from all other countries). 
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Table 3.4: Differentials of Characteristics Between Enterprises Under Three 
Ownership Types. 
 
A. Comparing state-owned and private-owned enterprises 
Outcome Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
ln(Output) 0.67 0.66 0.59 0.53 0.51 0.39 0.52 0.23 0.12 
ln(Exporting value) 0.24 0.19 0.13 0.09 0.03 -0.03 -0.18 -0.30 -0.42 
ln(Value added per Worker) 1.02 0.96 0.96 0.86 0.83 0.78 0.73 0.65 0.62 
ln(New product output value 
per worker) 
0.70 0.70 0.73 0.77 0.71 0.69 - 0.58 0.54 
ln(Wage per worker) 0.21 0.14 0.19 0.11 0.07 0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 
ln(Capital per Worker) -0.16 -0.24 -0.18 -0.27 -0.27 -0.27 -0.20 -0.22 -0.20 
 
B. Comparing state-owned and foreign-owned enterprises 
Outcome Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
ln(Output) 1.12 1.12 1.11 1.04 1.02 0.92 1.09 0.80 0.72 
ln(Exporting value) 0.72 0.67 0.64 0.56 0.58 0.45 0.39 0.25 0.14 
ln(Value added per Worker) 1.28 1.21 1.20 1.08 1.03 0.93 0.83 0.75 0.70 
ln(New product output value 
per worker) 
1.47 1.42 1.52 1.28 1.17 1.15 - 0.72 0.73 
ln(Wage per worker) 0.58 0.53 0.54 0.45 0.40 0.36 0.25 0.21 0.21 
ln(Capital per Worker) 0.60 0.51 0.47 0.38 0.32 0.26 0.30 0.21 0.20 
  
C. Comparing private-owned and foreign-owned enterprises 
Outcome Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
ln(Output) 0.45 0.46 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.58 0.57 0.60 
ln(Exporting value) 0.49 0.48 0.52 0.47 0.55 0.48 0.57 0.55 0.55 
ln(Value added per Worker) 0.26 0.26 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.09 0.08 
ln(New product output value 
per worker) 
0.76 0.72 0.80 0.51 0.47 0.47 - 0.15 0.19 
ln(Wage per worker) 0.37 0.39 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.27 0.26 0.26 
ln(Capital per Worker) 0.76 0.74 0.65 0.65 0.58 0.53 0.50 0.43 0.40 
Notes: Tables A, B, and C report the coefficients of Ownership Type dummy in (3.4.1); All 
coefficients are significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 3.5: Own and Cross Type Localization Spillovers. 
 
Dependent Variable: Log of Enterprise Value Added 
 
 STATE OWNED PRIVATE OWNED  FOREIGN OWNED 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Log Own Industry Employment       
(State-owned) 0.013*** 
(0.003) 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
(Private-owned) 0.029*** 
(0.003) 
0.030*** 
(0.003) 
0.020*** 
(0.001) 
0.019*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
(Foreign-owned) 0.000 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
Log Production Inputs       
Labor 0.722*** 
(0.018) 
0.708*** 
(0.018) 
0.512*** 
(0.006) 
0.520*** 
(0.006) 
0.548*** 
(0.007) 
0.559*** 
(0.007) 
Capital 0.296*** 
(0.015) 
0.306*** 
(0.015) 
0.249*** 
(0.003) 
0.244*** 
(0.003) 
0.316*** 
(0.008) 
0.311*** 
(0.008) 
Year, City, 4-Digit Industry Dummies Y - Y - Y - 
City*Year Dummies - Y - Y - Y 
4-Digit Industry Dummies - Y - Y - Y 
Adjusted R
2
  0.71 0.71 0.48 0.49 0.51 0.54 
# Enterprises 58,879 58,879 1,092,188 1,092,188 334,888 334,888 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the 4-Digit Industry level; ***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% 
level; *Significant at the 10% level; Industry 16 “Tobacco Products Processing” has been excluded. 
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Table 3.6: Own and Cross Type Localization Spillovers Differentiating Between 
Private and Collective Owned Enterprises. 
 
Dependent Variable: Log of Enterprise Value Added 
 STATE OWNED  
 (1) (2) 
Log Own Industry 
Employment 
  
(State-owned) 0.014*** 
(0.003) 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
(Private-owned) 0.029*** 
(0.004) 
0.027*** 
(0.004) 
(Collective-owned) - 0.012*** 
(0.003) 
(Foreign-owned) 0.002 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
Log Production Inputs   
Labor 0.711*** 
(0.020) 
0.709*** 
(0.018) 
Capital 0.305*** 
(0.015) 
0.305*** 
(0.015) 
City*Year Dummies Y Y 
4-Digit Industry Dummies Y Y 
Adjusted R
2
  0.71 0.71 
# Enterprises 58,879 58,879 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the 4-Digit Industry level; 
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level;*Significant at the 10% level; Industry 16 
“Tobacco Products Processing” has been excluded. 
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Table 3.7: Own and Cross Type Localization Spillovers, by Source of Foreign Investment. 
 
Dependent Variable: Log of Enterprise Value Added. 
 STATE OWNED 
 
   PRIVATE OWNED ETHNICALLY 
CHINESE OWNED 
     NON-ETHNICALLY 
CHINESE OWNED 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Log Own Industry Employment         
(State-owned) 0.014*** 
(0.003) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
(Private-owned) 0.029*** 
(0.003) 
0.030*** 
(0.003) 
0.020*** 
(0.001) 
0.019*** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
(Ethnically Chinese-owned) 0.006 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.013*** 
(0.002) 
0.013*** 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
(Non-ethnically Chinese-owned) -0.007* 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
0.015*** 
(0.002) 
Log Production Inputs         
Labor 0.721*** 
(0.018) 
0.708*** 
(0.018) 
0.512*** 
(0.006) 
0.520*** 
(0.006) 
0.562*** 
(0.007) 
0.579*** 
(0.007) 
0.542*** 
(0.008) 
0.546*** 
(0.009) 
Capital 0.296*** 
(0.015) 
0.306*** 
(0.015) 
0.249*** 
(0.003) 
0.244*** 
(0.003) 
0.289*** 
(0.007) 
0.282*** 
(0.007) 
0.327*** 
(0.009) 
0.326*** 
(0.009) 
Year, City, 4-Digit Industry 
Dummies 
Y - Y - Y - Y - 
City*Year Dummies - Y - Y - Y - Y 
4-Digit Industry Dummies - Y - Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R
2
  0.71 0.71 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.53 0.54 
# Enterprises 58,879 58,879 1,092,188 1,092,188 178,933 178,933 155,955 155,955 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the 4-Digit Industry level; ***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level;*Significant at the 
10% level; Industry 16 “Tobacco Products Processing” has been excluded. 
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Table 3.8: Own and Cross Type Localization Spillovers (single-plant firms only). 
 
Dependent Variable: Log of Enterprise Value Added 
 
 STATE OWNED  PRIVATE OWNED FOREIGN OWNED 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Log Own Industry Employment       
(State-owned) 0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.003* 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
(Private-owned) 0.032*** 
(0.004) 
0.032*** 
(0.004) 
0.018*** 
(0.001) 
0.017*** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
(Foreign-owned) -0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.015*** 
(0.002) 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
Log Production Inputs       
Labor 0.729*** 
(0.019) 
0.716*** 
(0.019) 
0.475*** 
(0.006) 
0.483*** 
(0.006) 
0.547*** 
(0.007) 
0.559*** 
(0.007) 
Capital 0.280*** 
(0.016) 
0.290*** 
(0.016) 
0.236*** 
(0.003) 
0.231*** 
(0.003) 
0.312*** 
(0.007) 
0.307*** 
(0.008) 
Year, City, 4-Digit Industry Dummies Y - Y - Y - 
City*Year Dummies - Y - Y - Y 
4-Digit Industry Dummies - Y - Y - Y 
Adjusted R
2
  0.68 0.68 0.42 0.44 0.50 0.51 
# Enterprises 45,744 45,744 769,860 769,860 300,736 300,736 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the 4-Digit Industry level; ***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% 
level;*Significant at the 10% level; Industry 16 “Tobacco Products Processing” has been excluded. 
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Table 3.9: Own and Cross Type Localization Spillovers, by Source of Foreign Investment (single-plant firms only). 
 
Dependent Variable: Log of Enterprise Value Added 
 STATE OWNED  
 
PRIVATE OWNED ETHNICALLY 
CHINESE OWNED 
NON-ETHNICALLY 
CHINESE OWNED 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Log Own Industry Employment         
(State-owned) 0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
(Private-owned) 0.032*** 
(0.004) 
0.032*** 
(0.004) 
0.019*** 
(0.001) 
0.017*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
(Ethnically Chinese-owned) 0.003 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.015*** 
(0.002) 
 
0.013*** 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
(Non-ethnically Chinese-owned) -0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.015*** 
(0.002) 
0.015*** 
(0.002) 
Log Production Inputs         
Labor 0.729*** 
(0.019) 
0.715*** 
(0.019) 
0.475*** 
(0.006) 
0.483*** 
(0.006) 
0.561** 
(0.007) 
0.578*** 
(0.008) 
0.539*** 
(0.008) 
0.544*** 
(0.009) 
Capital 0.280*** 
(0.016) 
0.290*** 
(0.016) 
0.236*** 
(0.003) 
0.231*** 
(0.003) 
0.289*** 
(0.007) 
0.282*** 
(0.007) 
0.323*** 
(0.009) 
0.321*** 
(0.009) 
Year, City, 4-Digit Industry 
Dummies 
Y - Y - Y - Y - 
City*Year Dummies - Y - Y - Y - Y 
4-Digit Industry Dummies - Y - Y - Y - Y 
Adjusted R
2
  0.68 0.68 0.42 0.44 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.54 
# Enterprises 45,744 45,744 769,860 769,860 163,744 163,744 136,992 136,992 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the 4-Digit Industry level; ***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level;*Significant at the 
10% level; Industry 16 “Tobacco Products Processing” has been excluded. 
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Table 3.10: Own and Cross Type Localization Spillovers (single-plant and multi-plant firms only)a . 
 
Dependent Variable: Log of Enterprise Value Added 
 STATE OWNED  PRIVATE OWNED FOREIGN OWNED 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Log Own Industry Employment       
(State-owned) 0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.003* 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
(Private-owned) 0.031*** 
(0.004) 
0.031*** 
(0.004) 
0.019*** 
(0.001) 
0.017*** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
(Foreign-owned) -0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.015*** 
(0.002) 
0.013*** 
(0.002) 
Log Production Inputs       
Log Labor 0.730*** 
(0.019) 
0.716*** 
(0.019) 
0.475*** 
(0.006) 
0.483*** 
(0.006) 
0.547*** 
(0.007) 
0.559*** 
(0.007) 
Log Capital 0.280*** 
(0.016) 
0.289*** 
(0.016) 
0.236*** 
(0.003) 
0.231*** 
(0.003) 
0.312*** 
(0.007) 
0.307*** 
(0.008) 
Year, City, 4-Digit Industry Dummies Y - Y - Y - 
City*Year Dummies - Y - Y - Y 
4-Digit Industry Dummies - Y - Y - Y 
Adjusted R
2
  0.68 0.68 0.42 0.44 0.50 0.51 
# Enterprises 45,744 45,744 769,860 769,860 300,736 300,736 
Notes: aTable displays Own Industry Employment in single-plant firms only. Coefficients of own industry employment in multi-plant 
firms are not reported in the interest of space. Observations include single-plant firms only; Standard errors in parentheses are robust and 
clustered at the 4-Digit Industry level; ***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level;*Significant at the 10% level; Industry 16 
“Tobacco Products Processing” has been excluded. 
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Table 3.11: Own and Cross Type Localization Spillovers, by Source of Foreign Investment (single-plant and multi-plant firms 
only). 
 
Dependent Variable: Log of Enterprise Value Added 
 STATE OWNED  
 
PRIVATE OWNED ETHNICALLY 
CHINESE OWNED 
NON-ETHNICALLY 
CHINESE OWNED 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Log Own Industry Employment         
(State-owned) 0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
(Private-owned) 0.031*** 
(0.004) 
0.031*** 
(0.004) 
0.019*** 
(0.001) 
0.017*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.004** 
(002) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
(Ethnically Chinese-owned) 0.003 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
0.013*** 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
(Non-ethnically Chinese-owned) -0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.015*** 
(0.002) 
0.015*** 
(.002) 
Log Production Inputs         
Labor 0.730*** 
(0.019) 
0.716*** 
(0.019) 
0.475*** 
(0.006) 
0.483*** 
(0.006) 
0.561** 
(0.007) 
0.578*** 
(0.008) 
0.539*** 
(0.008) 
0.544*** 
(0.009) 
Capital 0.280*** 
(0.016) 
0.289*** 
(0.016) 
0.236*** 
(0.003) 
0.231*** 
(0.003) 
0.289*** 
(0.007) 
0.282*** 
(0.007) 
0.323*** 
(0.009) 
0.321*** 
(0.009) 
Year, City, 4-Digit Industry 
Dummies 
Y - Y - Y - Y - 
City*Year Dummies - Y - Y - Y - Y 
4-Digit Industry Dummies - Y - Y - Y - Y 
Adjusted R
2
  0.68 0.68 0.48 0.44 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.51 
# Enterprises 45,744 45,744 769,860 769,860 163,744 163,744 136,992 136,992 
Notes: aTable displays Own Industry Employment in single-plant firms only. Coefficients of own industry employment in multi-plant firms are not reported in the 
interest of space. Observations include single-plant firms only; Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the 4-Digit Industry level; ***Significant at the 
1% level; **Significant at the 5% level;*Significant at the 10% level; Industry 16 “Tobacco Products Processing” has been excluded. 
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Table 3.12: Own and Cross Type Localization Spillovers Controlling for Output Market Competition. 
 
Dependent Variable: Log of Enterprise Value Added 
 
 STATE OWNED PRIVATE OWNED FOREIGN OWNED 
Log Own Industry Employment    
(State-owned) 0.012*** 
(0.003) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
(Private-owned) 0.024*** 
(0.004) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
(Foreign-owned) 0.000 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
Log Number of Own Industry 
Enterprises 
   
(Private-owned) 0.030*** 
(0.020) 
0.040*** 
(0.005) 
0.038*** 
(0.006) 
(Foreign-owned) -0.003 
(0.025) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
0.017** 
(0.006) 
Log Production Inputs    
Labor 0.708*** 
(0.018) 
0.516*** 
(0.006) 
0.550*** 
(0.007) 
Capital 0.305*** 
(0.015) 
0.248*** 
(0.003) 
0.315*** 
(0.0078) 
City*Year Dummies Y Y Y 
4-Digit Industry Dummies Y Y Y 
Adjusted R
2
  0.71 0.42 0.52 
# Enterprises 58,879 1,092,188 334,888 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the 4-Digit Industry level; ***Significant at the 1% level; 
**Significant at the 5% level;*Significant at the 10% level; Industry 16 “Tobacco Products Processing” has been excluded. 
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Table 4.1: Optimal Effort Levels. 
 
 Ownership of Enterprise 
Control of Production 
    , 
Foreign firm   owns 
    ,  
Chinese firm   owns 
   
  = 0,  
Foreign firm   controls 
production 
Wholly Foreign Owned Not Observed 
       ⁄         ⁄  
    (    )   ⁄      (    )   ⁄  
    (   )    ⁄         ⁄  
   
  = 1,  
Chinese firm   controls 
production 
Sino-Foreign Joint Venture Domestic Firm 
    (  (   )    )   ⁄         ⁄  
    ((     )(    ))   ⁄  
  
 (  (     )  )   ⁄  
    (     )     ⁄         ⁄  
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Table 4.2: Data Definitions and Summary Statistics. 
 
  Variable Definition Mean St. Dev. 
    
Firm Level    
Distance to Domestic Technology 
Frontier 
Difference between own and maximum log TFP of domestic 
Chinese firms within four digit CIC 
 
3.523 2.111 
Log Value Added Log of real value added, in 1000 Yuan 8.486 2.109 
    
Domestic Sales Share Share of total sales directed to the domestic Chinese market 0.642 0.427 
    
Affiliation Dummy Takes the value 1 if joint venture affiliated with central 
government or provincial government, 0 otherwise 
0.112 0.315 
    
Log Employment Log of total employment 5.024 1.024 
    
4-digit Industry Level     
Increase in State Share of Industry 
Sales 
Increase in SOE share of industry sales, at the four digit CIC 
between1998 and 2000 
 
-0.048 0.060 
Manager‟s Outside Option Total number of firms in 4- digit CIC and city as a share of 
total number of firms in city  x 100 
  
0.007 0.012 
    
Notes: All variables are measured as of 2000 unless otherwise noted; CIC is the Chinese Industrial Classification; SOE is state-
owned enterprise.  
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Table 4.3: Multinomial Logit Model of Changes in Organizational Form. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 WFOE DOM  WFOE DOM  WFOE DOM 
Firm-level variables         
Distance to Domestic 
Technology Frontier 
0.072*** 
(0.023) 
-0.054* 
(0.029) 
 0.075*** 
(0.026) 
-0.111*** 
(0.035) 
 0.056** 
(0.027) 
-0.097*** 
(0.035) 
Log Value Added 0.105*** 
(0.026) 
-0.054 
(0.033) 
 0.101*** 
(0.029) 
-0.111*** 
(0.037) 
 0.083*** 
(0.029) 
-0.105*** 
(0.038) 
Domestic Sales Share -0.509*** 
(0.064) 
0.285*** 
(0.045) 
 -0.517*** 
(0.070) 
0.950*** 
(0.107) 
 -0.383*** 
(0.072) 
0.867*** 
(0.112) 
Log Employment 0.027 
(0.034) 
0.285*** 
(0.045) 
 0.035 
(0.036) 
0.347*** 
(0.049) 
 0.055 
(0.037) 
0.301*** 
(0.050) 
      
Two Digit Industry Dummies? N  Y  Y 
Province Dummies? N  N  Y 
Number of Observations 12,339  12,339  12,339 
Log Likelihood -7,709.26  -7,648.21  -7,435.68 
Pseduo-R2 0.016  0.023  0.05 
Schwarz criterion 15,512.73  15,899.33  16,039.50 
Aikake criterion 15,438.53  15,424.42  15,119.36     
Notes: Estimations based on sample of all Sino-foreign joint ventures established between 1992 and 2000 in the 2000 Annual 
Survey of Industrial Production; Sino-foreign joint venture is the base category; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%; Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
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Table 4.4: Elasticities and Standard Errors. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 WFOE DOMESTIC  WFOE DOMESTIC  WFOE DOMESTIC 
Distance to Domestic 
Technology Frontier 
0.232*** 
(0.069) 
-0.214** 
(0.098) 
 0.253*** 
(0.079) 
-0.401*** 
(0.114) 
 0.193** 
(0.082) 
-0.347*** 
(0.116) 
Log Value Added 0.798*** 
(0.189) 
-0.550** 
(0.261) 
 0.807*** 
(0.211) 
-1.004*** 
(0.299) 
 0.674*** 
(0.217) 
-0.929*** 
(0.305) 
Domestic Sales Share -0.323*** 
(0.36) 
0.648*** 
(0.063) 
 -0.324*** 
(0.039) 
0.617*** 
(0.065) 
 -0.249*** 
(0.040) 
0.555*** 
(0.068) 
Log Employment 0.030 
(0.146) 
1.325*** 
(0.210) 
 0.047 
(0.156) 
1.615*** 
(0.230) 
 0.159 
(0.163) 
1.392*** 
(0.235) 
Notes: Elasticity calculations based on MNL models given in Table 3.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Standard 
errors in parentheses. 
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Table 4.5: Multinomial Logit Tests of the Property Rights Theory. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 WFOE DOM  WFOE DOM  WFOE DOM 
Firm-level variables          
Distance to Domestic Technology 
Frontier 
0.082*** 
(0.023) 
-0.041 
(0.030) 
 0.092*** 
(0.026) 
-0.093*** 
(0.035) 
 0.072*** 
(0.027) 
-0.090** 
(0.035) 
Distance to Domestic Technology 
Frontier * Affiliation Dummy 
-0.092*** 
(0.027) 
-0.117*** 
(0.037) 
 -0.102*** 
(0.027) 
-0.111*** 
(0.037) 
 -0.127*** 
(0.032) 
-0.061 
(0.037) 
Log Value Added 0.106*** 
(0.026) 
-0.055* 
(0.034) 
 0.111*** 
(0.029) 
-0.109*** 
(0.038) 
 0.094*** 
(0.030) 
-0.108*** 
(0.038) 
Log Value Added * Manager‟s Outside 
Option 
-0.874*** 
(0.275) 
-0.068 
(0.359) 
 -0.999*** 
(0.329) 
0.311 
(0.357) 
 -0.959*** 
(0.327) 
0.658* 
(0.359) 
Domestic Sales Share -0.512*** 
(0.073) 
0.953*** 
(0.110) 
 -0.493*** 
(0.076) 
0.925*** 
(0.113) 
 -0.379*** 
(0.078) 
0.847*** 
(0.118) 
Domestic Sales Share * Change in State 
Share of Industry Sales 
0.111 
(0.611) 
-1.302** 
(0.562) 
 0.0.329 
(0.626) 
-0.915 
(0.658) 
 0.189 
(0.640) 
-0.641 
(0.667) 
Log Employment 0.040 
(0.035) 
0.296*** 
(0.046) 
 0.040 
(0.036) 
0.348*** 
(0.049) 
 0.064* 
(0.037) 
0.303*** 
(0.050) 
Two Digit Industry Dummies? N  Y  Y 
Province Dummies? N  N  Y 
Number of Observations 12,334  12,334  12,334 
Log Likelihood -7,686.19  -7,625.25  -7,414.64 
Pseduo-R2 0.018  0.030  0.053 
Schwarz criterion 15,523.1  15,909.90  16,053.90 
Aikake criterion 15,404.38  15,390.49  15,089.29 
Notes: Estimations based on sample of all Sino-foreign joint ventures established between 1992 and 2000 in the 2000 Annual Survey 
of Industrial Production; Sino-foreign joint venture is the base category; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%; Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity.  
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